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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis created a matrix to compare the four post-Cold War Nuclear Posture 
Reviews (NPRs) published by the United States Department of Defense. Side-by-side 
comparison of these white papers revealed remarkable trends in U.S. nuclear policy. The 
matrix began by assigning themes within NPRs to paradigms common to international 
relations research. These paradigms are declaratory policy, procurement policy, 
employment policy, and deployment policy. This thesis began by analyzing the history of 
NPRs and reactions to them in the scholarly and international communities. Next, it 
created an impartial summary of the identified themes as they are tracked through the 
NPRs. This thesis then analyzed and critiqued the trends in nuclear policy based on the 
matrix, scholarly reactions to NPRs, and other research related to U.S. force structure and 
the worldwide threat environment such as the economic interdependence between the 
United States and China and how it affects the two countries’ relationship. Some policy 
trends followed party lines; others did not. Some were erratic and others were more 
predictable. The value of these trends validates some concerns and disproves others with 
regard to the U.S. nuclear posture and the worldwide threat environment. The thesis 
concluded that the world is a safer place with nuclear weapons, and although a world free 
of nuclear weapons is a responsible goal for future policymakers, it is simply not 
practical for the foreseeable future. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The four post-Cold War United States Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs) are lenses 
into the nuclear policy of the current and past presidential administrations. NPRs define 
declaratory policy, employment policy, procurement policy, and deployment policy for 
U.S. nuclear capabilities. Although the first NPR under the William J. Clinton 
administration was a sigh of relief after the darkness of the Cold War, trends in U.S. nuclear 
policy in response to international threats show a world returning to great power 
competition. What are the trends in the United States’ nuclear policy since the end of the 
Cold War? Analysis of NPRs will illustrate the trends in U.S. nuclear policy since the end 
of the Cold War and how these trends might be changing with the rise of great power 
competition. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Clinton administration, with its 
so-called “Bottom-Up Review,” began a new exercise in transparency by reviewing 
national defense capabilities much like the modern Quadrennial Defense Review. From the 
Clinton administration’s report, the Nuclear Posture Review emerged as an extension 
focusing on nuclear capabilities and policy. Since then, the George W. Bush 
administration, the Barack H. Obama administration, and the Donald J. Trump 
administration have each published stand-alone Nuclear Posture Reviews. These reviews 
reflect contemporary thinking along multiple dimensions that reflect changes in United 
States nuclear doctrine and policies, but also act as a reflection of changes across the 
strategic landscape. By tracking changes along these policy and doctrinal dimensions this 
thesis will identity how changes in the strategic setting have shaped United States policy 
since the end of the Cold War. It will also identify if these longstanding trends have 
changed with the increase in great power competition that United States policymakers 
apparently recognized in the continuation of the long pre-occupation with the so-called 
Global War on Terror (circa 2011). 
2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the end of the Cold War, the public has widely disregarded nuclear weapons. 
Nonetheless, debate continues among scholars and politicians throughout the arms control, 
nonproliferation, and international political communities about the contemporary role of 
weapons of mass destruction. The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is an 
occasional white paper on current and projected United States nuclear strength and 
structure in response to worldwide threats. This makes it an excellent primary source for 
the role of nuclear weapons as interpreted by presidential administrations and military 
leadership. Surrounding United States NPRs is a plethora of scholarly and non-scholarly 
reactions and analysis of the international and domestic implications of NPRs. 
Given the recent publication of the 2018 NPR, there is little commentary published 
about it. Nevertheless, there is an abundant amount of published work about previous 
NPRs, and additional published works covering topics ranging from arms control and 
proliferation to modernization and missile defense. The United States Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) produces a significant number of scholarly works on U.S. nuclear policy and 
NPRs. NPS-related works generally support conclusions within NPRs, yet outside of NPS 
publications, there is a lack of consensus on the implications of NPRs. 
There is a major gap in research on U.S. nuclear policy trends since the end of the 
Cold War. There have been four NPRs since the end of the Cold War, one within each of 
the four post-Cold War presidential administrations. President William J. Clinton initiated 
the first in 1994,1 a result of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, followed by President George 
W. Bush in 2001,2 President Barack H. Obama in 2010,3 and President Donald J. Trump 
in 2018.4 Documentation of the NPR has evolved over time; President Clinton’s was 
 
1 Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: Office of Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 1994. 
2 United States Congress, Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: 2002. 
3 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2010. 
4 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2018. 
3 
simply an assortment of unpublished PowerPoint slides coinciding with press releases from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (see Appendix B.). President Bush’s NPR was kept 
classified; however, in 2002, a non-classified version of the report was released after the 
original report had been presented to the United States Congress. This report looked much 
more like a scholarly article than a government document. President Obama’s NPR was 
revolutionary in terms of format; his administration’s document was a publicly released 
fifty-page report with graphics and easy-to-read formatting. President Trump’s report 
followed this same format but was substantially longer than President Obama’s. Common 
inclusions in the NPRs are analyses of the current worldwide threat environment,  
current United States nuclear capabilities, a lens into the current administration policy 
toward nuclear weapons, and proposals on not only the future role of nuclear weapons, but 
also future projects and developments within the United States nuclear force. Notably, 
there are several documents worth examination which coincide with the NPRs, such as the 
Bottom-Up Review, Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), and the Missile Defense 
Review (MDR). 
NPS has been a significant source of scholarly response to NPRs. However, there 
is no NPS-related or sponsored material in response to the 2018 NPR as of yet. NPS 
response to NPRs was strongest for the 2001 and 2010 NPRs; there is a lack of NPS 
material related to the 1994 NPR. Works completed and published by NPS faculty and 
students overwhelmingly show positive support of the NPRs and have an optimistic 
outlook on current and future United States nuclear posture. Most notably, a thesis has 
already been conducted by an NPS student which compares the 1994, 2001, and 2010 
reports.5 The method of this thesis sets a framework to compare and explore past NPRs in 
a historical framework. This thesis requires an update to include the 2018 NPR to 
accurately continue analysis of post-Cold War United States nuclear posture and strategy. 
Two other theses are of importance to this topic, one discussing nuclear norms6 and the 
 
5 Marco J. Lyons, “U. S. Nuclear Policy, Strategy, and Force Structure: Insights and Issues from the 
1994, 2001, and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
6 Michael W. Preczewski, “Normative Factors in U. S. Nuclear Policy” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2016). 
4 
other discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).7 Another important 
NPS-related work is a book edited by Jeff Larsen and James Wirtz responding to the 2001 
NPR.8 David Yost and James Russell also make notable contributions to United States 
NPR response.9 
Non-NPS related material contains more opposition to implications set forth by 
NPRs, particularly the 2001 and 2018 NPRs. Non-military reactions to NPRs domestically 
follows party lines; positive response typically comes from conservative authors and 
negative response comes from liberal authors. Domestic reaction to NPRs is loud among 
left-wing activists who are passionate about nonproliferation and arms control. “Nuke-
zero” is a recurring theme which envisions a world without nuclear weapons. Domestic 
reaction to President Obama’s NPR was relatively positive, but negative toward President 
Bush’s and President Trump’s respective NPRs. The Arms Control Association publishes 
a significant amount of material, both positive and negative, about many aspects of nuclear 
weapons and policy. Another substantial source of material is the Journal for Peace and 
Nuclear Disarmament. 
Among more positive responses, Brad Roberts, Matthew Kroenig, John Harvey, 
and Elbridge Colby all have important insight to the United States’ nuclear policy and their 
work will be important to identifying themes and trends within post-Cold War NPRs. 
Lawrence Freedman authors a book entitled The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,.10 Brad 
Roberts, prior to the 2018 NPR, published The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st 
Century in which he breaks down evolution of the United States’ nuclear policy and posture 
 
7 Jeffrey R. Frost, “Assessing Possible Improvements in NATO’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Deterrence 
Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017). 
8 James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Nuclear Transformation: The New U. S. Doctrine (New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
9 Such as David S. Yost, “Strategic Stability in Europe,” The Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 2 (June 
27th, 2013), 236; James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. 
Security Strategy in the Middle East,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (August 2002); and James A. Russell and 
James J. Wirtz, “Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture Review,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 5 
(June 2002). 
10 Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 3rd Edition, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. 
5 
post-Cold War and discusses nuclear deterrence, strategy, and problems in the modern 
nuclear world, to include regional and bilateral relationships.11 
Reactions by NATO members and other nations, such as Japan,12 who rely on 
United States extended deterrence are extremely important as these countries heavily rely 
on United States nuclear strength due to their geographic proximity to Russia and other 
threats, particularly in Northeast Asia. Concern among NATO members and countries who 
rely on United States extended deterrence is that the United States NPRs show a lack of 
consideration to NATO’s deterrence needs, despite a clear trend found in NPRs that 
continuously confirms U.S. commitment to NATO and non-strategic deterrence. Other 
international response both affiliated and nonaffiliated with NATO show fear that the trend 
seen in United States nuclear posture will provoke Russia and China into further 
proliferation, or at the very least modernization, therefore destabilizing the world’s nuclear 
environment even further. 
There are serious gaps in international scholarly works understanding Russian and 
Chinese nuclear policy. First, they fail to accurately analyze Russian nuclear posture and 
intent. Second, they fail to reference the strong economic interdependency between the 
United States and China. Although these two topics are important, they fall outside of the 
larger scope of United States nuclear posture and this thesis. Entire books have been and 
could be written on both topics, but still fail to offer concrete theories through a different 
lense. 
Lastly, an investigation and examination of non-scholarly works was conducted to 
get an idea of the public opinion and general sense or feeling of United States nuclear 
posture. This included news articles and reports, opinion pieces, and presentations on 
United States nuclear posture. Unsurprisingly, all these sources are rather lacking as the 
general public is not talking about the United States nuclear posture. Therefore, there is not 
a large number of non-scholarly works. News sources lack depth or context and were 
 
11 Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford, California: 
Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016. 
12 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review, 14:2 (July 2007), 
303–328. 
6 
surprisingly unbiased, yet some carried a negative undertone. Opinion pieces from non-
scholarly sources and authors represented both sides of the aisle. Unfortunately, no other 
secondary sources were located other than sets of briefing slides on the NPRs. 
Current material surrounding NPRs lacks consensus as well as historical context, 
producing a need to evaluate themes and trends. NPS material mentioned previously reacts 
in a mostly positive way to NPRs and United States nuclear posture. Yet non-NPS 
publications, such as Anna Peczeli’s “Back to Great Power Competition,” express fear that 
the trend of United States nuclear posture is encouraging proliferation and a new arms 
race.13 These analyses could be accurate; however, these sorts of articles all lack a proper 
consideration of the worldwide nuclear trends and themes in U.S. policy since the end of 
the Cold War. They blame the NPRs for stimulating proliferation and making the world 
nuclear threat environment increasingly fragile, yet they fail to acknowledge that United 
States NPRs are responses to the current threat environment. 
This lack of acknowledgment highlights another major weakness in response to 
NPRs. No authors whom I have found, whether authoring a positive or negative response, 
analyze the actual United States nuclear posture trends and themes since the end of the 
Cold War and since the publication of the 2018 NPR. They fail to examine how many 
warheads are currently actively deployed, current command, control, and communications 
systems, and current defenses and non-proliferation efforts. No works ask the question of 
whether or not the current system is practical or efficient to the current threat environment 
or why either the system or the threat environment has changed. They simply ponder the 
implications of force structure on future nuclear threats and security issues. Three further 
topics which are lacking from response to NPRs throughout the last three decades are 
discussions of nuclear terrorism, intelligence, and cyber or robotic threats; all three of 
which are talking points mentioned in multiple NPRs. 
In conclusion, even though many scholarly responses to NPRs, particularly the 
2018 NPR, assert that the NPRs raise more questions than answers, the reactions 
 
13 Anna Peczeli, “The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Back to Great Power 
Competition,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 2 (October 2018). 
7 
themselves only further this problem. Common themes among the research which was 
conducted are that deterrence is necessary; the nuclear triad is constantly questioned (but 
remains effective); that United States NPRs are adapting and evolving with the post-Cold 
War security climate; norms and the taboos of nuclear use; reorganizations and 
modernizations within the United States nuclear force are of concern; and Russia and China 
are increasing threats (in particular Russia’s alleged illegal annexation of Crimea). 
Common themes which occur in NPRs which are generally left out of scholarly works are 
nuclear terrorism, intelligence, cyber threats, United States and China’s economic 
interdependence, and Russia’s own nuclear posture. Reactions and response to NPRs also 
highlight fears of proliferation and modernization, yet few provide specific evidence 
directly linking NPRs to proliferation and modernization. Lack of consensus, an agreeable 
historical context for NPRs, conversation about the to-date efficiency and practicality of 
the United States nuclear force, conversation about nuclear terrorism and cyber threats, and 
intelligence which supports NPRs as well as the speculative nature of scholarly and non-
scholarly responses to NPRs paint a confusing picture of the actual current United States 
nuclear posture, trends, and themes since the end of the Cold War. By creating a matrix 
identifying the United States’ nuclear policy trends, a contribution can be made to alleviate 
some of this confusion. This matrix can be found in the Appendix section, under the title, 
“NPR Trends Matrix.” 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Realists would suggest that the United States’ nuclear policy is shaped by the 
international threat environment as perceived by specific administrations. Construction of 
an NPR also is a bureaucratic exercise, involving different agencies and departments 
balancing their own interests and objectives with the overall foreign policy vision 
embraced by the president and his key advisors. NPRs are not only lenses into the inner 
workings and intentions of the current administration but tools to appeal for support and 
solicit money for nuclear programs and policies. 
When examined side by side, NPRs show common trends among past and present 
administrations’ nuclear policies. For example, even though all NPRs clearly state a vision 
8 
of a world without nuclear weapons to some extent, the role of nuclear weapons as a 
strategic deterrent is also acknowledged. Furthermore, the need to modernize and maintain 
nuclear weapons, infrastructure, command and control, and delivery systems in the 
meantime is evident in most of the reports. Each NPR contains verbiage about a world free 
of nuclear weapons as well as noting the continued role played by nuclear weapons in 
national security; however, each presidential administration to produce an NPR has had a 
different stance on the priority of disarmament versus sustainment of United States nuclear 
forces and preservation of worldwide security. 
The most important theme among all four post-Cold War NPRs is that nuclear 
weapons are here to stay for generations, despite hopes and dreams of a nuclear weapon-
free future. The world is arguably a safer place with nuclear weapons,14 despite continued 
tension between states, such as India and Pakistan. Threat of nuclear weapon use, although 
it has led the world very close to the brink of catastrophic war, has ultimately made the 
world a safer place by reducing the number of wartime casualties since its first use.15 
Furthermore, when nations do go to war in modern times, the scale of the conflict, 
determination of proper use of force, and ultimate price of the skirmish is lower due to 
nuclear deterrence than if the war had occurred in a world without nuclear weapons.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will create an issue matrix to identify trends in the United States’ nuclear 
policy. It will analyze the 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs as well as related documents, 
motivations, format, and production process. It will focus on four categories and their 
subcategories aligning with tenets of nuclear policy. These are declaratory policy (what do 
presidential administrations say about great power competition, the nuclear triad, 
command, control, and communications, intelligence, critical infrastructure, nuclear 
terrorism and non-state actors, treaties, human capital, foreign threats, allied and NATO 
 
14 As evidenced in Colin Schultz, “Globally, Deaths From War And Murder Are in Decline,” 
Smithsonian, March 21st, 2014; and reference in the 2018 NPR. 
15 Colin Schultz, “Globally, Deaths From War And Murder Are in Decline,” Smithsonian, March 21st, 
2014. 
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commitments, and nonproliferation and threat reduction), employment policy (how does 
the presidential administration plan to use deterrence, offense, defense, chemical/biological 
deterrence, and civilian factors), procurement policy (what is the presidential 
administration planning to buy or fund such as delivery systems, warheads, command, 
control, and communications systems, critical infrastructure, etc.), and deployment policy 
(where and how are nuclear systems such as ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, and non-strategic 
(NATO) forces going to be used?). This will enable a general summary of nuclear policy 
and priority and allow trends to be identified and examined. 
In addition to using NPRs as primary sources, scholarly publications about these 
documents are abundant (with exception to the 2018 NPR) and will be used to inform the 
analysis. NPRs are the assessment of the current presidential administration and the DoD. 
Scholarly documents provide additional perspectives and constructive criticism to NPRs. 
Themes identified by the matrix will enhance our general understanding of the 
trends in U.S. nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. The analysis will also identify 
themes and trends in U.S. nuclear policy that might have escaped notice. Identifying these 
themes and variables can give some indications of current trends and potential changes in 
the United States’ nuclear policy. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will begin with a short description of NPRs and the reactive material 
related to each, and will explain what a white paper is and how it is used. Understanding 
the definition of a white paper is crucial to understanding the purpose and intent of NPRs 
as a presidential administration tool or platform for conveying nuclear policy. The 
subsequent two chapters will identify and then analyze trends in U.S. nuclear policy as 
defined by NPRs. To conclude, themes will be applied to controversy and reaction to NPRs 
to fill gaps and holes in responsive literature. This structure was chosen since NPRs are 
primary sources and are the base of the research matrix.  
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II. WHAT IS A NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW? 
The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a white paper produced 
periodically by the Department of Defense (DoD) outlining U.S. nuclear capabilities, 
policies, and future modernization plans. Definitions of white papers are often vague. 
Nevertheless, white papers are usually government reports that not only provide 
information about specific issues or capabilities, but also explain future objectives and 
desired policies as well. NPRs are used to explain the nuclear philosophies and policies of 
specific administrations to the American military, the public, allies, and foes. The 
information contained within NPRs help observers understand both the current and future 
U.S. nuclear posture. 
This thesis will examine all U.S. government white papers that address the U.S. 
nuclear posture. The so called “Bottom Up Review,” conducted by the William J. Clinton 
administration in 1994, was the first government white paper that served the function of an 
NPR. The second, and more controversial NPR was undertaken by the George W. Bush 
administration in 2001–2002. The third NPR, which reflected the ideology of the “Prague 
Spring,” was undertaken by the Barack H. Obama administration in 2010. The most recent 
NPR was conducted by the Donald J. Trump administration in 2018. 
NPRs are directed as a matter of law by Congress. Although they are undertaken 
by the DoD, other stakeholders in nuclear strategy and force structure generally participate 
in undertaking the review. The other government agencies include the Department of 
Energy (DOE), Department of State (DOS), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the 
services. These other agencies bring their own perspectives and concerns to the review 
process. For instance, according to Amy F. Woolf of the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), “DOE, and its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA), oversee the research, development, testing, and acquisition programs that 
produce, maintain, and sustain the nuclear warheads.”16 Woolf adds that, “DoD develops, 
 
16 Amy F. Woolf, The U. S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites, 
CRS Report No. R45306 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018). 
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deploys, and operates the missiles and aircraft that deliver the nuclear warheads.”17 
Furthermore, the role of the IC cannot be underappreciated. According to Charles Ball, “If 
the U.S. intelligence community fails to stop even a small percentage of plots to use WMD 
against the United States, the consequences could be catastrophic. Ergo, the need for 
exquisite intelligence.”18 A Nuclear Posture Review can thus reflect a “whole of 
government” perspective on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. 
NPRs are not necessarily stand-alone documents. The original post-Cold War NPR 
in 1994 was a supplement to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.19 Other NPRs have coincided 
with the DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and have been closely related to the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. Recently, the Trump administration unveiled 
the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the same format as an NPR and containing 
much of the same language and information.20 Furthermore, the 2018 NPR was linked to 
the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) 2018 Global Nuclear Landscape report.21 
A. 1994 NPR 
The NPRs themselves vary significantly in size, format, and production. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Clinton administration, with its so-called 
“Bottom-Up Review” began a new exercise in transparency by reviewing national defense 
capabilities much like the modern Quadrennial Defense Review. From the Clinton 
administration’s report, the Nuclear Posture Review emerged as an extension focusing on 
nuclear capabilities and policy. The 1994 NPR was a collaborative effort of the DoD and 
armed services that was initiated due to changes in the security environment, DoD budget 
 
17 Woolf, The U. S. Nuclear Weapons Complex. 
18 Charles Ball, “Intelligence and the NPR,” in Nuclear Transformation, The New U.S. Nuclear 
Doctrine, ed. James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 128. 
19 Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 1993. 
20 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2019. 
21 Defense Intelligence Agency, Global Nuclear Landscape 2018. 
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constraints, and to plan substantial reductions.22 Intended to be a comprehensive review of 
policies and forces,23 it was a compilation of press releases including statements, speeches, 
and slides that at times got off topic due to the informal nature. 
At the end of the Cold War, the public began to widely disregard nuclear weapons. 
Nonetheless, debate continued among scholars and politicians throughout the arms control, 
nonproliferation, and international political communities about the contemporary role of 
weapons of mass destruction. The 1994 NPR was hailed by the 1995 Annual Defense 
Report as being, “the first review of nuclear policy in the post-Cold War world, the first 
such review in 15 years, and the first review ever to include policy, doctrine, force 
structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, security, and 
arms control.”24 The 1994 NPR did not create much of a stir in policy circles. It seemed to 
reflect an expected effort to generate a “peace dividend” following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The available commentary depicts the nuclear posture review as relatively 
benign. Dunbar Lockwood, in an issue of Arms Control Today just two months after the 
release of the 1994 NPR, dismisses many of Clinton’s policies announced in the review 
when he says that, “the NPR contains no fundamental changes in doctrine on the use of 
nuclear weapons.”25 Available media reports on the 1994 NPR, such as the small 
“Washington Outlook” snippet in Aviation Week and Space Technology printed in Figure 
1, simply listed the recommendations imposed by the review. Today, 25 years after the first 
NPR was released, it is still not widely discussed or debated. 
 
22 Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, 1994. 
23 Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review, 1994. 
24 Annual Report to the President and Congress, Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Defense, 1995, 83. 
25 Dunbar Lockwood, “New Nuclear Posture Review Shows Little Change in Policies,” Arms Control 
Today 24, no. 9 (November 1st, 1994): 27. 
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Figure 1. List of the recommendations imposed by the NPR, 
printed without commentary in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology September 26, 199426 
An Elusive Consensus by Janne E. Nolan is one of the only sources of information 
on the 1994 NPR. Nolan provides an unbiased and thorough account of the review;27 
however, she critiques the 1994 NPR as being bureaucratic and flawed in its production 
design.28 Nolan’s book offers an invaluable glimpse into public reaction at the time, stating 
that media was excited about the review in general. There was an expectation that Ashton 
“Ash” Carter, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 
would “reinvent nuclear strategy.”29 
 
26 Source: Paul Mann, “Proceeding Gingerly,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 26, 
1994. 
27 Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security After the Cold 
War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, 35–62. 
28 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 103. 
29 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 41. 
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The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability claims that there was 
infighting during production of the 1994 NPR, particularly surrounding Ash Carter.30 
Nolan sheds light on the internal clash that took place during production,31 provides 
evidence of partisan opposition to the NPR by Republicans,32 and shows that military 
leaders, particularly at the U. S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), were not enthusiastic 
about the 1994 NPR.33 According to Nolan, “Some senior military officers and career 
officials appointed to oversee the effort not only were opposed to many of the policy 
departures being put forward by political appointees but also, as became increasingly 
obvious, were not supportive of the overall review process.”34 Furthermore, many senior 
military and government officials wanted to distance themselves from the project, whether 
due to bureaucracy or simply not wanting to be a part of the controversy, or they were 
preoccupied with other things.35 These conspiracies erupted due to Secretary Carter 
directing the working groups to produce a wide range of options, including elimination of 
the ICBM force, which many were opposed to.36  
B. 2001 NPR 
The 2001 NPR was more developed than the 1994 production. It was directed by 
Congress, compiled by the DoD, and associated with the End-to-End Review.37 It was a 
classified report to the United States Congress not originally released to the public meant 
to, “Lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years.”38 
The 2001 NPR was not released in a particular format, however it did contain organized 
 
30 “1994 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Strategy, December 31st, 2001. 
31 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 51. 
32 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 55. 
33 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 54–55. 
34 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 51. 
35 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 51. 
36 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, 51–55; “1994 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Strategy, 
December 31st, 2001. 
37 United States Congress, Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: 2002. 
38 United States Congress, Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review. 
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sections. Since the public release only consisted of excerpts from a classified report, the 
document was sometimes fragmented and hard to read. The scholarly community may 
never know how much information was held back. 
The 2001 NPR was the first NPR to generate a significant amount of reaction from 
the academic and policy community. It began a trend of scholarly and non-scholarly works 
containing opposition than support to implications set forth by NPRs, particularly the 2001 
and 2018 NPRs. Non-military reactions to NPRs domestically follow broader political 
outlooks; positive response typically comes from conservative authors and negative 
response comes from observers that embrace a liberal perspective. 
Scott Westan placed the 2001 NPR in his so-called broad deterrence camp in his 
assessment of different camps of nuclear policy in anticipation of the 2010 NPR.39 Westan, 
along with many others, believes that the reinvention of the nuclear triad was the most 
important part of the 2001 NPR. He describes media reports on the 2001 NPR as being 
alarmist, particularly the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times.40 Westan challenges 
the response to the 2001 NPR when he claims that, “What most critiques fail to take into 
account is the degree to which the NPR is separated from academic and social debates 
about nuclear weapons.”41 Westan adds that supporters believe it was a, “critical step 
forward in achieving national security goals.”42 Keith Payne, an author of the 2001 NPR, 
even wrote an article entitled “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight” 
to defend the report due to the significant amount of alarmist response.43 
The 2001 NPR met its heaviest resistance for seeking to acquire an earth penetrating 
nuclear warhead.44 This created a conversation about how the United States should 
 
39 Scott Westan, “Preparing for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: Post-Cold War Nuclear Deterrence 
and the 2001 NPR Debate,” Strategic Insights 8, no. 1 (January 2009). 
40 Scott Westan, “Preparing for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review.” 
41 Scott Westan, “Preparing for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review.” 
42 Scott Westan, “Preparing for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review.” 
43 Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” The Washington 
Quarterly 28 no. 3 (June 1st, 2005): 133-151. 
44 “The Nuclear Posture Review: What Role for Nuclear Weapons?” Strategic Comments 8, no. 3 
(April 1st, 2002), 1–2. 
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respond to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), relocatable targets, and deeply buried or reinforced targets. Steve Fetter and 
Charles L. Glaser contradicted the 2001 NPR by claiming that, “Most underground 
facilities also can be defeated with conventional weapons if good intelligence is 
available… thus, nuclear weapons would be useful for defeating hard and deeply buried 
targets only under a fairly narrow range of circumstances.”45 Furthermore, James A. 
Russell and James J. Wirtz claim that the Middle East was becoming the focus of U.S. 
nuclear strategy.46 The 2001 NPR also surfaced dialog about negative security assurances, 
which according to Russell and Wirtz are “statements made by U.S. policymakers that the 
United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are also 
signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).”47 Critics scrutinized negative security 
assurances claiming that the 2001 NPR identified non-nuclear states as potential targets.48 
Russell and Wirtz conclude that these concerns are absurd, because the U.S. only intended 
to use nuclear weapons against states with WMD.49 
Notably, the best source this research found for reactions to the 2001 NPR both 
positive and negative was Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine edited 
by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen.50 Unfortunately, examining reactions to NPRs 
in-depth falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, the 2001 NPR was successful in 
stimulating discussions of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-strategic 
 
45 Steve Fetter and Charles L. Glaser, “Critiquing the NPR’s New Nuclear Missions,” in Nuclear 
Transformation, The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine, ed. James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 25–26. 
46 James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security Strategy 
in the Middle East,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (August 2002). 
47 James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture 
Review,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 5 (June 2002). 
48 Russel and Wirtz, “Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture Review.” 
49 Russel and Wirtz, “Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture Review.” 
50 James J Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear 
Doctrine (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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nuclear weapons, arms control, nuclear infrastructure, and power balances between states 
such as India and China.51 
C. 2010 NPR 
The 2010 NPR was revolutionary in format. It was released in the form of an official 
report with sections, graphics, and a table of contents.52 Titled the “Nuclear Posture 
Review Report,” the 2010 NPR states it was legislatively mandated and created by the 
DoD.53 According to then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the 2010 NPR “provides 
a roadmap for implementing President Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the 
U. S., allies and partners, and the international community.”54 
Response to the 2010 NPR was more positive than the previous NPRs, but far from 
exclusively optimistic. After the signing of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty) by President Obama in Prague in 2010, much of the reactionary scholarly works to 
the 2010 NPR focused on international relations implications. As Westan predicted, the 
2010 NPR focused on offering a vision for the U.S. moving toward a minimum deterrent.55 
Paul Meyer stated that 
The salient issues of the review from an international perspective were the 
definition of the role for nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy; the nature of the 
security assurances the U.S. was prepared to give to non-nuclear weapons 
states; what action the U.S. would take on outstanding nuclear disarmament 
commitments; what would be done to strengthen nonproliferation and 
nuclear security; and how the U.S. would approach relations with other 
nuclear weapons processing states.56 
 
51 Wirtz and Larsen eds., Nuclear Transformation. 
52 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2010. 
53 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, i. 
54 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, i. 
55 Scott Westan, “Preparing for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review.” 
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Many of the reactions to the 2010 NPR that fell into the foreign affairs category 
questioned whether or not the U.S. was setting a good example for nonproliferation efforts. 
Scott D. Sagan and Jane Vaynman in their article entitled, “Lessons Learned from the 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review” contend that they, “find convincing evidence that U.S. nuclear 
disarmament initiatives have had a positive influence in a number of countries, along with 
a mixed record in many others (where at least some indicators suggest that a government 
may be positively influenced in the future).”57 However, David Yost argues that reduced 
numbers of nuclear weapons are a bad thing for NATO and Europe. Yost claims that 
analysts exaggerated the benefits of minimal nuclear deterrence; that NATO countries rely 
on United States nuclear weapons for more than just deterrence against a nuclear attack but 
also against conventional aggression.58 
Secondly to international relations issues, the 2010 NPR’s domestic policy goals 
set nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as fundamental.59 According to Marco J. 
Lyons, “The 2010 NPR touched off debate about the particular challenges and threats of 
reducing to very low nuclear arms levels (aspects of this debate reach back to the 1990s). 
Competing arguments over abolition—and what some authors have called 
‘delegitimization’—have been revived, but they are not significantly different from those 
advanced in earlier generations of disarmament thinking.”60 This includes the concept of 
“Global Zero,” an initiative within the 2010 NPR that had been introduced by President 
Obama in a 2009 speech in Prague as a world free of nuclear weapons.61 
 
57 Scott D. Sagan and Jane Vaynman, “Lessons Learned from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” The 
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D. 2018 NPR 
The 2018 NPR follows the same format as the 2010 NPR; however, it is almost 
fifty percent longer. Mandated by Congress, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis wrote 
that President Donald J. Trump directed the DoD on January 27, 2017, “to conduct a new 
[NPR] to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that protects the homeland, 
assures allies and above all, deters adversaries.”62 The 2018 NPR was much more blunt 
than its predecessors, it attempted to be clear and concise on its policies, plans, and figures, 
and most importantly describes the details of past administrations’ failings to improve the 
U.S. nuclear posture. Further discussion on these policies, plans and figures will be 
conducted in Chapter II. 
The 2018 NPR under President Trump has been extremely controversial; inciting 
aggressive debates from both sides of the aisle. Watchdog groups such as War on the Rocks 
and the Arms Control Association both publish a large number of articles, typically positive 
and negative responses, respectively. According to Frank A. Rose and Benjamin Bahney 
of War on the Rocks, democrats need to respect U.S. nuclear policy and strategic stability; 
that China and Russia are not only rapidly modernizing their militaries but are also 
becoming more aggressive in their regions.”63 Titles among articles published by the Arms 
Control Association indicate quite the opposite opinion such as “Effective Arms Control 
Under Threat,” “Self-Made Iran Crisis Goes from Bad to Worse,” “Bolton’s Attempt to 
Sabotage New START,” and “Trump Arms Control Gambit: Serious or a Poison Pill?” 
One article published by the Arms Control Association admits that the Trump 
administration is “setting out a clear marker for Iran as to what constitutes unacceptable 
nuclear behavior.”64 However, the same authors believe that President Trump has simply 
caused a renewed nuclear crisis with Iran.65 
 
62 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
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The 2018 NPR led to heated debate among scholars as well, particularly foreign 
scholars—allies and foes alike. According to Bahram M. Rajaee and Mark J. Miller, “Too 
often, U.S. national security and foreign policy debates are bereft of any real appreciation 
of non-U.S. perspectives—an unfortunate pattern.”66 This theory is evidenced in the 
response to the 2018 NPR. Anna Peczeli claims that the 2018 NPR is inciting a return to 
great power competition because it abandons, “the balance between arms control, and 
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.”67 The 2018 NPR also generated 
a negative response among allies. Many expressed a concern that President Trump’s NPR 
puts the United States first and does not account for the impact the document will have on 
the policies of other nuclear weapon states.68 This was surprising since the it contained 
strong rhetoric in support of allied and NATO commitments. According to Jacek Durkalec,  
While the NPR has elements of continuity, the changes it proposes will have 
an impact on the U.S. contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. 
The document raises several questions about NATO’s future nuclear 
trajectory: is NATO on the right path for adapting and strengthening its 
deterrence policy and posture? How should NATO allies approach a nuclear 
confrontation with Russia? What kinds of nuclear capabilities are sufficient 
for deterrence? What should be the future of NATO’s collective deterrence? 
What should be the balance between deterrence and disarmament? How 
should NATO adapt its policy on nuclear arms control? What kind of 
nuclear message should NATO send to the outside world? How the NATO 
allies approach these questions is significant. One of the key priorities of 
the NPR is to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance, and without 
Allied support these goals will not be achieved.69 
Therefore, despite strong statements in the 2018 NPR affirming the United States 
to its commitment to NATO, the report seems to raise more questions than answers in the 
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scholarly community. Interestingly, many of the negative scholarly responses refer to the 
2018 NPR as “Trump’s NPR.”  
Even though there is change, there is a significant amount of continuity to previous 
NPRs and presidential administrations.70 According to Michal Smetana, “The specific 
policy guidance reflects, above all, the long-held views and priorities of the Department of 
Defense (DoD), and likely would not differ substantially under any other Republican 
administration in the current strategic environment.”71 Perhaps one reason why the 2018 
NPR is so controversial is due to the aggressive measures the Trump administration has 
taken. Since the publication of the 2018 NPR, the Trump administration has withdrawn 
from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty72 and engaged both North Korea 
and Iran in aggressive diplomacy about each country’s respective nuclear programs. 
However, according to David Williams of the Los Angeles Times, at the same time, “The 
Trump administration has quietly dismantled or cut back multiple programs that were 
created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to help detect and prevent terrorism involving 
weapons of mass destruction,”73 contradicting many statements within the 2018 NPR. 
E. POST-COLD WAR NUCLEAR TRENDS 
None of the commentary on these NPRs offers a comparative analysis of the trends 
and themes since the end of the Cold War since the publication of the 2018 NPR. They fail 
to examine how many warheads are currently actively deployed, current command, control, 
and communications systems, and current defenses and non-proliferation efforts. No works 
ask the question of whether or not the U.S. nuclear enterprise effectively addresses the 
current threat environment. They generally explore the implications of force structure on 
future nuclear threats and security issues. 
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Realists would suggest that the United States’ nuclear policy is shaped by the 
international threat environment as perceived by specific administrations. Construction of 
an NPR also is a bureaucratic exercise, involving different agencies and departments 
balancing their own interests and objectives with the overall foreign policy vision 
embraced by the President and his key advisors. NPRs are not only lenses into the inner 
workings and intentions of the current administration but tools to generate support and 
funding for nuclear programs and policies. Although rhetoric may be contradictory, when 
examined side by side, NPRs show common trends among administrations’ nuclear 
policies encompassing all post-Cold War presidential administrations, regardless of 
political affiliation. 
Themes identified in post-Cold War NPRs enhance our general understanding of 
the trends in U.S. nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. The analysis also identified 
themes and trends in U.S. nuclear policy that might have escaped notice. Identifying these 
themes and variables can give some indications of current trends and potential changes in 
the United States’ nuclear policy. 
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III. TREND IDENTIFICATION IN POST-COLD WAR NPRS 
The U.S. NPR has become a staple of post-Cold War United States nuclear force 
structure and policy, yet they raise more questions than answers. This thesis has created a 
matrix utilizing four criteria to identify and understand trends in post-Cold War U.S. 
nuclear policy as represented in the NPRs. These criteria are declaratory policy (what the 
administration says about nuclear weapons), employment policy (how the administration 
plans to use nuclear weapons), procurement policy (what the administration wants to 
acquire with regard to nuclear weapons), and deployment policy (how nuclear weapons 
and systems will be operationally structured). Underlying these criteria are a plethora of 
issues such as nuclear warhead production and maintenance, delivery systems, critical 
infrastructure, command and control, and human capital.  
Identification of themes was a flexible process. While analyzing the four post-Cold 
War NPRs, some themes such as delivery systems stood out. Others, such as human capital, 
were more challenging to identify. The matrix allowed side-by-side comparison of NPRs 
and clear patterns and trends to be identified. The analysis began by comparing the formats, 
related documents, and production characteristics of NPRs. All four NPRs were 
legislatively mandated, had a direction set by the president, and to some extent were a 
collaborative effort of the DoD and armed services. Other agencies were included or 
referenced such as DOE, DOS, and the IC, but did not tend to play a significant role. While 
the original 1994 NPR was simply a compilation of press releases, the NPR evolved by 
2018 into a larger, more formatted report—released in the form of a white paper with 
sections, graphics, and index information, indicating the growing importance of nuclear 
posture in the modern political environment. 
Overall, elements of most NPRs seem to remain classified. Motivations behind each 
NPR are seemingly simple, yet they are an indication of the political environment in their 
time. The 1994 NPR was developed out of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review due to changes in 
the security environment, DoD budget constraints, and planning substantial reductions.74 
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The 2001 NPR was mandated to “Lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over 
the next five to ten years.”75 The 2010 NPR was a “roadmap for implementing President 
Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the U.S., allies, and partners, and the 
international community.”76 Lastly, the 2018 NPR was created “to ensure a safe, secure, 
and effective nuclear deterrent that protects the homeland, assures allies, and above all, 
deters adversaries.”77 The language of the 1994 NPR indicates a “sigh of relief” after the 
Cold War and the 2001 NPR does not appear to be pessimistic in any way. By contrast, the 
rhetoric of the 2010 and 2018 NPRs are much more alarmist, demonstrating a return to 
worldwide nuclear risk and a need to respond appropriately. 
A. DECLARATORY POLICY 
Declaratory policy is a term used often in the realm of deterrence and nuclear 
policy. It is made up of assertions about the role of nuclear weapons in the current 
worldwide political environment. The trend matrix created by this thesis identified great 
power competition, the nuclear triad, nuclear command, control, and communications 
(NC3), critical infrastructure, nuclear terrorism and non-state actors, treaties, human capital 
and civilian employees, foreign threats, allied and NATO commitments, and 
nonproliferation and threat reduction to be declaratory themes among the NPRs.  
1. Great Power Competition and U.S. Nuclear Force Structure 
The 1994 NPR all but considered the days of great power competition to be over. 
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry commented that, “Now, with the end of the Cold 
War, that dark nuclear cloud has drifted away, and the whole world breathes easier in the 
sunlight.”78 This meant a shift from mutually assured destruction (MAD) to an 
environment of mutually assured safety (MAS).79 Although there is no specific mention 
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of great power competition in the publicly released version of the report, the 2001 NPR 
declares that it aims to dissuade adversaries from entering competition.80 The 2010 NPR 
also had no specific mention of great power competition, yet outlined key objectives of 
maintaining a stable bilateral balance and avoiding competition.81 The return of great 
power competition was a major theme in the 2018 NPR. It claimed that Russian actions 
were at fault for the return of great power competition and that China was seeking to 
counter the United States82 Nevertheless, the 2018 NPR starkly declares that, “The United 
States does not wish to regard either Russia or China as an adversary and seeks stable 
relations with both.”83 Rhetoric such as this indicates that the Trump administration does 
not seek a return to great power competition; however, it is taking a realist approach to 
international relations and seems to be preparing for a world where Russia and China 
become more assertive. 
U.S. response to great power competition is achieved through the nuclear triad, the 
U.S. nuclear posture of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Submarine Launched 
Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and bomber aircraft. Although support of the nuclear triad was 
maintained from the Cold War, the 1994 NPR said that it was “time to change the way we 
think about nuclear weapons.”84 The 2001 NPR made a dramatic declaration to abolish the 
nuclear triad in favor of a “New Triad,” composed of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive 
strike systems, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure.85 The 
new triad and the 2001 NPR were meant to be a blueprint for transforming U.S. strategic 
posture and changing the approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in deterrent 
strategy.86 The 2010 NPR made no mention of the 2001 NPR’s new triad, but rather 
declared that the Obama administration’s perspective on the triad was that it should be safe, 
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secure, and effective.87 The 2010 NPR asserted that the U.S. maintained more nuclear 
weapons than it needed to for deterrence.88 It further considered elimination of one leg of 
the traditional nuclear triad; however, it chose to minimalize the triad and make it more 
efficient.89 The 2018 NPR does not make any dramatic declarations of change to the 
nuclear triad, it simply concurs that it is the most cost-effective and strategically sound way 
of producing deterrence.90 The 2018 NPR additionally states that the triad is supplemented 
by NATO dual-capable aircraft and NC3, and supports diversity and flexibility.91 
The importance of NC3 grows throughout the evolution of the post-Cold War 
NPRs. The 1994 NPR declared it would maintain the current system, and bounded C3 with 
intelligence.92 The 2001 NPR characterized its own version of NC3: command, control, 
planning, and intelligence.93 The Bush administration NPR declared that command and 
control was critical to ensure effectiveness of the force structure and that it will become 
more complex and require augmentation, modernization, and replacement.94 The 2001 
NPR also closely links command and control to targets as a means of ensuring strike and 
missile defense capability.95 The 2010 NPR declared that NC3 must provide maximum 
presidential decision-making time.96 The 2018 NPR dramatically stated that NC3 had not 
been updated for three decades and that it needs modernization.97 It declared that NC3 
must be flexible and capable to adjust to change to enable tailored deterrence and meet 
diverse and changing threats.98 Closely linking NC3 to the nuclear triad throughout the 
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entirety of the report, the 2018 NPR specifically declares that NC3 has five crucial 
functions: detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; 
decision-making conferencing; receiving presidential orders; and enabling the 
management and direction of forces.99 
NC3 can be closely linked with critical infrastructure. Apart from the 1994 NPR, 
each NPR purports that nuclear infrastructure is aging and in need of investment. The 1994 
NPR aimed to maintain selected portions of the defense industrial base that are unique to 
strategic and nuclear systems.100 This plan to simply maintain systems was first challenged 
by the 2001 NPR. It claimed that underinvestment and shortfalls plagued critical 
infrastructure.101 The 2010 NPR declared that investments must be made in critical 
infrastructure—in particular the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).102 The 2010 NPR 
claimed that investments “will allow the United States to shift away from retaining large 
numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, 
allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile.”103 Furthermore, infrastructure must 
be integrated among federal authorities in order to be maintained.104 The 2018 NPR shares 
this sentiment, saying that nuclear infrastructure has suffered through decades of neglect 
and underfunding yet an effective, responsive, and resilient system is necessary to 
flexibility.105 The 2018 NPR bluntly claims that the DOE says infrastructure is atrophied, 
and that the Trump administration will resume underground testing if necessary.106 Lastly, 
the 2018 NPR defines the DoD as defining the requirements for nuclear weapon 
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infrastructure, and tasks NNSA with overseeing research, development, testing, 
assessment, and production programs for meeting DoD requirements.107 
Part of nuclear critical infrastructure as outlined by NPRs is human capital. Much 
like the 1994 NPR’s laissez-faire attitude toward infrastructure, The Clinton administration 
NPR also proposes shifting nuclear scientists into the civilian sector.108 The 2001 NPR is 
the first to declare that personnel with critical skills must be preserved. It claims that the 
United States must transfer design knowledge between generations and exercise skills for 
adapting warheads to delivery systems.109 The 2010 NPR asserts that morale is slipping 
due to aging facilities and lack of national consensus on the role of nuclear weapons.110 It 
adds that emphasis must be placed on enhancing personnel and that human capital must be 
managed, investments must be made, and that it is difficult to recruit and maintain scientists 
and engineers from the next generation.111 The 2018 NPR further hails nuclear personnel 
for their service and dedication, despite the rigorous standards they are held to.112 It claims 
that the U.S. will invest in personnel and various NNSA and service responsiveness 
programs—claiming retaining personnel requires opportunities for exercising skills.113 
Although the first two post-Cold War NPRs were silent on the role of civilians in 
the nuclear weapon industry, the Obama and Trump administrations’ NPRs both made 
specific mention. The 2010 NPR was the first to delineate civilian personnel as being 
involved in nuclear weapons infrastructure,114 even though it had very little say on the 
topic. The 2018 NPR not only continued this demarcation but also represented civilians as 
decision makers.115 Furthermore, the 2018 NPR commented on the decline in civilian and 
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military wartime deaths since the creation of nuclear weapons,116 as shown in Figure 2, 
and indicates its desire to pursue technology which would minimize civilian casualties.117 
 
Figure 2. Chart from the 2018 NPR on wartime fatalities as a 
percent of the world population118 
2. Treaties and Allied Commitments 
Treaties are an important part of declaratory policy. Each of the four post-Cold War 
NPRs had a significant amount of discussion on the topic. The 1994 NPR emphasized the 
importance of treaty implementation post-Cold War, particularly START.119 It stated that 
the U.S. will continue to conform to current treaties, create force plans based on assumed 
implementation of START I and START II, and fully implement the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).120 The 2001 NPR explained that the U.S. was complying with 
START I and that transparency was a good baseline for treaties, yet START II was 
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unacceptable, probably incompatible with the new triad.121 Furthermore, the 2001 NPR 
wanted to retain the United States’ ability to test in the future and therefore would only 
comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), making no mention of 
ratification.122 The 2010 NPR stated that it would seek ratification of the CTBT.123 It also 
accused other countries of violating the NPT (in particular North Korea and Iran) and stated 
that the NPT must be renewed and strengthened.124 It furthermore described development 
of New START to drastically reduce the Moscow Treaty numbers, and proposed a fissile 
material cutoff treaty.125 The 2018 NPR clearly states that it will comply with all current 
treaties and agreements, including the NPT, and that they contribute to risk reduction 
through diplomacy, but only if verifiable.126 Nevertheless, The Trump administration NPR 
claims Russia is violating multiple treaties, in particular the Intermediate Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty.127 Furthermore, the 2018 NPR declares it does not support the 
Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, stating that it is “fueled by wholly unrealistic expectations 
of the elimination of nuclear arsenals without the prerequisite transformation of the 
international security environment.”128 Lastly, the 2018 NPR declared that it would not 
seek ratification of the CTBT yet still supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
Preparatory Committee, otherwise known as the Preparatory Commission..129 The 
Commission is a UN organization whose objective is to “achieve the object and purpose 
of the Treaty, to ensure the implantation of its provisions, including those for international 
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verification of compliance with the Treaty, and to provide a forum for consultation and 
cooperation among Member States.”130 
All four NPRs to some extent support U.S. allies and NATO partners. The 
importance of this element of declaratory policy is noted in domestic and international 
reactions to NPRs. The 1994 NPR simply maintained its commitments to U.S. allies and 
NATO.131 In its text, the 2001 NPR maintains its support of NATO and dual-capable 
aircraft; however, it proposes a review in fiscal year 2002.132 The 2010 NPR declared that 
the nuclear threat to NATO was historically low, U.S. presence was vital to cohesiveness 
and comfort of the states, and that any change to NATO’s posture should be thoroughly 
reviewed and decided upon by the alliance.133 Notably, the 2010 NPR specifically 
mentions that no such alliance exists in the Asian theater; however, it asserts its support of 
current commitments in the region.134 The 2018 NPR contained strong language in support 
of its allies and partners, and that reliable and credible partnerships would contribute to 
nonproliferation goals.135 This is notable because a significant amount of scholarly 
response to the 2018 NPR accused the Trump administration of putting America first and 
disregarding NATO and allied commitments. 
3. Nonproliferation and Worldwide Nuclear Threats 
Nonproliferation and threat reduction are often achieved through treaties; however, 
statements made by administrations on these topics are very important to understanding 
the administrations’ philosophy. The 1994 NPR’s priority was to stem proliferation and 
coined the term “counterproliferation,” especially due to concern over “loose nukes,” or 
unsecured nuclear weapons within the former Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
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(USSR).136 The 1994 NPR declared its support for UN and international nonproliferation 
efforts, and communicated the Clinton administration’s desire to hasten START I, START 
II, and future reduction negotiations.137 The 2001 NPR had no specific mention of 
nonproliferation in the unclassified release of the report.138 Although it did have a section 
entitled, “Nuclear Reductions and Implementations for Arms Control,” the Bush 
Administration NPR did not contain any rhetoric in regard to worldwide initiatives.139 The 
2010 NPR was the first to set a framework for future policy to work toward “nuke zero,” a 
world without nuclear weapons, and countering proliferation through a three-element 
approach.140 The 2010 NPR declared that the U.S. would not develop new warheads or 
test current warheads, yet it would increase NNSA funding by twenty-five percent and 
focus strongly on enforcing consequences of NPT non-compliance.141 The 2018 NPR 
remarks that the United States will increase transparency and predictability to avoid 
miscalculation among other nuclear states.142 The 2018 NPR states that nonproliferation 
efforts must be verifiable and enforceable and therefore supports various international arms 
control organizations in hopes of an ultimate goal of one day eliminating nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons.143 
Each post-Cold War NPR outlines, to some degree, its assessment of foreign 
threats. The 1994 NPR was almost exclusively concerned with Russia, claiming that the 
former USSR was lagging on drawing down and still unstable and uncertain.144 It declared 
that the United States must not become complacent, rather it should remain conscious of 
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the way it conducts itself because these actions will influence Russia.145 The 2001 NPR 
was concerned over the size and posture of Russian nuclear and conventional forces and 
the continuing development of Chinese forces, and identified the threat of potential 
contingency operations in North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran.146 The 2010 NPR 
continued this trend, stating that Russia and China were primary nuclear threats.147 It 
declared that Russian relations at the time were good and that China and the United States 
were becoming more interdependent; however, there was concern over the rate at which 
China was expanding.148 Furthermore, the 2010 NPR states that the United States must 
focus on reducing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran.149 The 2010 NPR noted 
that the United States must strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards to impede nuclear trade and enforce consequences.150 The 2018 NPR was the 
most blunt in terms of accusing states of posing a threat to the United States. It 
demonstrated that the U.S. has reduced its number and salience of nuclear weapons even 
though no other country is following its lead.151 It claimed North Korea is violating UN 
security council guidance and that Iran, despite its agreed-upon constraints, still has the 
capacity to produce a nuclear weapon in less than a year.152 The 2018 NPR is full of 
rhetoric about uncertainty and unanticipated threats and risks as well as concern over 
countries developing cyber capabilities.153 Unlike any other NPR, the Trump 
administration’s NPR specifically outlines tailored strategies for Russia, China, North 
Korea, and Iran.154 
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A potential worldwide nuclear threat could come from nuclear terrorism or non-
state actors. The 1994 NPR was primarily concerned with nuclear materials falling into the 
wrong hands, especially in former USSR states.155 The unclassified excerpts from the 2001 
NPR do not specifically indicate concern over terrorist possession of nuclear weapons or 
material; however, it does state that, “Terrorist or rogue states armed with weapons of mass 
destruction will likely test America’s security commitments to its allies and friends.”156 In 
this instance, WMD could also mean chemical or biological weapons. The 2010 NPR 
boldly claims that the WMD threat is growing and makes preventing nuclear terrorism its 
number one priority.157 The Obama administration’s NPR, much like the 2001 NPR, 
specifically says that the United States’ Cold War-era arsenal is not suited to counter 
terrorism and proliferation of terrorism and non-state actors. According to the 2010 NPR, 
the U.S. should improve nuclear forensics to counter use and renew its commitment to 
holding anyone who supports proliferation accountable.158 The 2018 NPR asserts that, 
“The United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state 
actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices.”159 It 
directly challenges the Kim regime in this context.160 The 2018 NPR’s proposed course of 
action is its so-called “defense-in-depth,” a multilayered approach encompassing such 
elements as securing nuclear weapons, enhancing cooperation with allies, and deterring 
state support for nuclear terrorism.161 
B. PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Procurement policy is like declaratory policy—it is what the presidential 
administrations plan to acquire with regard to nuclear weapons. Procurement policy was 
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identified in the matrix by statements in NPRs to purchase, invest, fund, develop, produce, 
replace, maintain, improve, modernize, research, or forecast for any component of the U.S. 
nuclear force structure. Common procurement themes in the four post-Cold War NPRs are 
delivery systems, warheads, NC3, and critical infrastructure. 
1. Warheads and Delivery Systems 
The centerpiece of the U.S. nuclear posture is the warheads themselves. The 1994 
NPR stated that it would not produce any new-design warheads, rather it would maintain 
the current warheads.162 The 1994 NPR further asserted that it would accomplish this by 
ensuring Tritium availability, enhancing conventional capability for hard underground 
target defeat, and stated that it would not test or produce fissile material.163 The 2001 NPR 
somewhat continued this trend by ensuring sustainment of the current stockpile.164 
However, the 2001 NPR controversially proposed development of an earth penetrating 
nuclear weapon to defeat hard and deeply-buried targets, and evaluation of a so-called 
Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) to “deny access to, immobilize, neutralize, or destroy 
chemical or biological weapons.”165 The 2010 NPR focused on extending the life of 
current warheads rather than building new warheads.166 It asserted that life extension 
programs (LEPs) would be funded and preferred,167 and that there would be no testing or 
developing of new warheads.168 The 2018 NPR was dramatically different and much more 
specific than the other three post-Cold War NPRs in many aspects of procurement policy, 
particularly with regard to development of new warheads. The 2018 NPR sought to develop 
a low-yield SLBM, identify a replacement for the B-83-1 gravity bomb commonly carried 
on USAF bomber aircraft, and explore a common reentry system for all ballistic missiles, 
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potentially replacing the W78 Minuteman III warhead to field a new warhead on the 
ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD)—the project to replace the ICBM fleet.169 The 
2018 NPR also notes that it will support an LEP for the B-61-12 gravity bomb, commonly 
carried on USAF bombers, while exploring modifications to fit it on the F-35 airframe, an 
LEP for the W76-1 Trident SLBM warhead, an LEP for the W80-4 ALCM warhead and 
synchronizing the warhead with the long range strategic option (LRSO) replacement 
program for air launched cruise missiles (ALCM), making alterations to the W88 Trident 
SLBM warhead, and sustaining the B-83-1 until a replacement can be found.170 
Delivery systems are just as important to the U.S. nuclear posture as the warheads 
themselves. The 1994 NPR quickly and clearly stated it would not produce more than 
twenty B-2 bomber aircraft, the U.S. would continue to produce the D-5 Trident II SLBM 
missile through 1995, replace the Minuteman III ICBM guidance and propulsion systems, 
and make upgrades to the B-52 bomber and Minuteman III coded control device.171 The 
2001 NPR recommended beginning a next-generation ICBM by replacing the propulsion 
system, indicated a potential to replace the SLBM by 2029, and planned for a new bomber 
around 2040.172 There was considerably more discussion of air options in the 2001 NPR, 
including an aggressive modernization plan for bombers and potentially making the joint 
strike fighter (JSF, now called the F-35) dual capable, yet the it specifically stated it had 
no plans for a new ALCM.173 The 2010 NPR was the first to announce a plan to create a 
capability for warheads to be interchangeable between delivery systems.174 The report 
contained little discussion of actual replacement plans, but stated that studies must be 
conducted to replace missiles and submarines; the focus of the report was on modernization 
and maintenance, particularly in bombers and submarines.175 The 2018 NPR described 
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that, “DoD will explore prioritization of existing research and development funding for 
advanced nuclear delivery system technology and prototyping capabilities. This will 
support the U.S. development of hedging options and focus, as necessary, on the rapid 
development of nuclear delivery systems, alternative basing modes, and capabilities for 
defeating advanced air and missile defenses.”176 This would include the Columbia Class 
program delivering twelve nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to replace 
the Ohio Class SSBN, beginning studies in 2020 for SLBM replacement, complete the 
GBSD program for 450 launch facilities (LF) and 400 ICBMs to modernize facilities and 
replace the Minuteman ICBM by 2029, modernize and sustain the B-52 and B-2, develop 
the B-21 Raider to counter enemy advances in air defense which would supplement and 
eventually replace the current bomber fleet beginning in 2020s, replace the ALCM with 
the LRSO, and outfit the F-35 for nuclear capability.177 Furthermore, the 2018 NPR would 
pursue a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)178 and sought to potentially explore the 
option of fielding the W78 nuclear warhead on a U.S. Navy flight vehicle.179 The W78 is 
currently used on Minuteman III ICBMs, and the 2018 NPR likely sought to modify the 
warhead to place on an SLBM. 
2. NC3 and Critical Infrastructure 
No statements of procurement intent were made for any elements of NC3 in the 
1994 NPR.180 The 2001 NPR sought to acquire new space, extremely high frequency, and 
cryptographic systems.181 It also planned for substantial investment in secure, wideband 
communications systems between decision makers, commands, and mobile commands.182 
The 2010 NPR simply aimed to conduct initiatives to improve resiliency and modernize, 
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as well as research for stronger NC3 systems.183 The 2018 NPR explicitly wanted to 
strengthen protection against space-based threats, especially training; strengthen protection 
against cyber threats, specifically continuing production of technology; enhance integrated 
tactical warning and attack assessment by modernizing satellites and missile defense 
sectors, transitioning the Defense Support System (DSP) to the Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS), enhancing ground based radars, and sustaining and upgrading the U.S. 
Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS); improve command posts and 
communications links to airborne, ground, and mobile command centers, communication 
terminals, transmitters, the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), and the 
Airborne Command Post (ABNCP); and advance decision support technology, reform 
governance, and integrate planning and operations.184 
Critical infrastructure is the final theme of procurement policy identified by the 
matrix. The 1994 NPR intended to fund sustainment of the Minuteman III industrial 
base.185 The 2001 NPR demonstrated a need to revitalize the nuclear weapons complex to 
design, develop, test, manufacture, and certify new warheads if required.186 It also 
illustrated a need to restore capacity and capability of production infrastructure.187 The 
2010 NPR was focused on modernizing physical infrastructure including national 
laboratories and supporting facilities; this meant fully funding NNSA, strengthening the 
science, technology, and engineering (STE) base, modernizing Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, and creating a new Uranium processing facility at Y-12.188 The 2018 NPR 
linked critical infrastructure with warhead sustainment programs. It sought to have the 
capacity to produce at least eighty Plutonium pits per year by 2030, fund Tritium programs, 
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explore options for rapid prototyping, fully fund Uranium processing facilities (UPF), 
reconstitute Lithium capabilities, and ensure reactor capacity.189 
There were several other notable, yet uncategorizable statements of procurement 
intention by the first three post-Cold War NPRs identified by the matrix. The 1994 NPR 
advocated for financial support of the Nunn-Lugar Program and optimizing the number of 
accident and incident response teams.190 The 2001 NPR sought a new “system of systems” 
for nuclear intelligence.191 It also considered lease or purchase of 767 tankers while 
waiting for the KC-X program to replace the KC-135 tanker fleet.192 The 2001 NPR 
identified that the KC-X replacement platform should be able to operate in a nuclear, 
biological, or chemical (NBC) environment.193 Lastly, the 2010 NPR desired investment 
in the congressionally mandated SSP.194 
C. EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
The matrix considers nuclear employment policy as statements about how nuclear 
weapons and their related systems are to be used to achieve a certain objective. The most 
important theme identified by the matrix across the four post-Cold War NPRs was 
deterrence. Other themes identified from statements contained within NPRs were offensive 
use of nuclear weapons, defensive use of nuclear weapons, use of nuclear weapons to 
combat chemical and biological weapons, and the role of civilians in the U.S. nuclear 
posture. 
1. Active Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Defense 
Each post-Cold War NPR emphasized the importance of deterrence; however, each 
NPR had identifiable differences with regard to how deterrence would be maintained. The 
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1994 NPR explained a balance between safety and security.195 This meant carrying out 
key missions to maintain deterrence: early warning, threat assessment, connectivity to 
national leadership, message dissemination, and force management.196 The 2001 NPR 
purported to shift away from relying on offensive forces for deterrence.197 It stated that, 
“Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of 1700–2200 strategic 
nuclear warheads by 2012… will support U.S. deterrence policy to hold at risk what 
opponents value, including their instruments of political control and military power, and to 
deny opponents their war aims.”198 Notably, this number of deployed nuclear weapons 
could have been influenced by the START agreements, and not necessarily what the Bush 
administration desired. The 2001 NPR further claims that a modern threat requires a 
flexibility of forces for modern deterrence.199 According to the 2010 NPR deterrence must 
be credible.200 The Obama administration’s NPR seemingly counters this when it claimed 
that it should scale back the U.S. nuclear force to move away from its Cold War era posture 
in favor of a U.S. nuclear posture that could counter nuclear terrorism and proliferation.201 
The 2018 NPR made strong statements as to its position on deterrence, ensuring enemies 
do not miscalculate consequences of nuclear use.202 It identified the realizations U.S. 
enemies must appreciate: “1) the United States is able to identify them and hold them 
accountable for acts of aggression, including new forms of aggression; 2) we will defeat 
non-nuclear strategic attacks; and, 3) any nuclear escalation will fail to achieve their 
objectives, and will instead result in unacceptable consequences for them.”203 The 2018 
NPR claims that there is no “one size fits all” in regard to deterrence, and that capabilities 
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must be flexible to tailor deterrence.204 It has several sections outlining what the United 
States will do if deterrence fails, including strengthening the role of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons.205 Lastly, the 2018 NPR claims that, “Effective deterrence is the foundation for 
effective assurance.”206 
Nuclear weapons as an offensive tool is debated by many in the public, scholarly, 
political, and military communities. The 1994 NPR, released in the immediate aftermath 
of the Cold War, recommended no nuclear weapons custody by U.S. ground forces and for 
strategic bombers and naval non-strategic nuclear forces to be taken off alert,207 an 
incredible stand-down to the United States’ Cold War nuclear posture. The 2001 NPR 
paired ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers with non-nuclear capabilities, creating the first leg 
of the “New Triad” of nuclear and non-nuclear systems.208 The 2010 NPR alleged a growth 
of “unrivaled” U.S. conventional military forces,209 reaffirmed the United States’ 
commitment to “open-ocean targeting,”210 and reiterated its commitment to maximizing 
presidential decision making time.211 The 2018 NPR, much like previous NPRs, linked 
missile defense with offensive operations if deterrence fails.212 It also notes that the U.S. 
has never adopted a “no first-use” policy, and argues that such a policy is inappropriate 
given the current threat environment.213 
Many aspects of offensive nuclear employment policy are also closely linked to 
defensive nuclear employment policy. The 1994 NPR asserts that the U.S. must not become 
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complacent and should maintain deterrence.214 It illustrated a need to develop theater 
defenses against ballistic missiles and personnel.215 The 2001 NPR considered the second 
leg of the New Triad to be defensive.216 It alleged that missile defenses were emerging in 
the air, land, and sea.217 It argued that passive and active defenses would dissuade 
adversaries.218 The 2010 NPR produced almost a decade later echoed the need to continue 
improving missile defenses—that Russian and Chinese capabilities were a cause for 
concern.219 Notably, the report also claims that Russia and China are modernizing their 
forces due to the United States’ “destabilizing” missile defense systems.220 The 2018 NPR 
only further stresses the importance of missile defense.221 
2. Non-traditional Role of Nuclear Weapons 
Employment of nuclear weapons to counter chemical and biological threats is the 
last common employment policy theme identified by the matrix across all four post-Cold 
War NPRs. The 1994 NPR simply stated its intention to improve real time detection of 
agents.222 The 2001 NPR, as previously mentioned, considered development of ADWs to 
assure allies.223 The 2010 NPR claimed that the nuclear weapon role in deterring chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) attacks was declining, and that a focus for deterring CBW 
attacks should utilize conventional forces.224 Lastly, the 2018 NPR simply stated that the 
U.S. must hedge against CBW threats, but no specifics were mentioned.225 
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D. DEPLOYMENT POLICY 
How nuclear weapons will be deployed by U.S. and allied forces is the last 
paradigm of nuclear policy explored by the matrix. Themes uncovered in the post-Cold 
War NPRs are deployment of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, as well as deployment of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons by NATO. Deployment policy is culmination of all other 
paradigms; it is the actions and not just the words. 
1. Nuclear Triad Delivery Systems 
The 1994 NPR announced the retirement of the W68 warhead from the Minuteman 
III.226 It clearly stated that there would be “Three wings of Minuteman III missiles carrying 
single warheads (500-450).”227 However, upon publishing of the 2001 NPR, the 
Peacekeeper missile was still actively deployed. The 2001 NPR sought to retire the 
Peacekeeper.228 At the time of the 2010 NPR’s release, there were 450 ICBMs on alert, 
all of which the Obama administration planned to “de-MIRV” (multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles).229 By the time the 2018 NPR was published, there were 400 
single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs spread between 450 LFs.230 The 2018 NPR claimed 
ICBMs are the most responsive leg, and that they are the most survivable due to the scale 
of an attack required to destroy U.S. ICBM capability would be astronomical.231 The 2018 
NPR aimed to maintain ICBM ability to be a high yield, accurate, prompt, and flexible leg 
of the triad.232 Lastly, the 2018 NPR claimed it would continue open-ocean targeting, but 
that ICBMs are critical for holding Eurasia at risk.233 
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The SLBM leg of the nuclear triad is much more secretive than its land or air-based 
counterparts. The 1994 NPR recommended retiring four Ohio Class SSBNs leaving 
fourteen SSBNs carrying an undisclosed number of D-5 Trident II SLBMs.234 The 2001 
NPR opted to continue this deployment, and proposed reconstituting the four retired 
SSBNs to transport special operations forces as part of the New Triad.235 The 2010 NPR 
contended to retain fourteen SSBNs, but consider reducing that number to twelve in the 
future.236 The 2018 NPR did not offer any specific numbers with regard to Ohio- Class 
SSBNs or Trident II SLBMs.237 It did, however, state that the SSBN fleet faced no credible 
threats, holds targets at risk throughout Eurasia, and could possess hypersonic SLBM 
capability.238 
Bombers are arguably the most erratic leg of the triad in regard to deployment. The 
1994 NPR claimed that it had originally planned for ninety-four B-52s, but reduced the 
number to sixty-six along with reorientation of the B-1 to fill a conventional role.239 The 
2001 NPR did not provide numbers, however it notes a necessity to keep the B-2 and B-52 
fleets operational for thirty-five to forty years.240 The 2010 NPR claimed the U.S. nuclear 
bomber fleet would be maintained and consisted of seventy-six B-52s and eighteen B-2s; 
however, the report also considered transitioning some B-52s to be dual capable.241 The 
2018 NPR describes the bomber fleet as being the most flexible and visible—to be used as 
a show of force.242 Capable of multiple warhead options, the 2018 NPR reported forty-six 
B-52Hs and twenty B-2As supported by refueling aircraft.243 
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2. Non-Triad Delivery Systems 
Much like employment policy, the matrix also identified idiosyncratic aspects of 
deployment policy. These elements come from support functions and nuclear force 
structures that predate the modern nuclear triad. The 1994 NPR sought to eliminate the role 
of carrier based dual-capable aircraft (DCA), retain continental based dual capable aircraft, 
and eliminate the option to carry nuclear missiles on surface navy ships,244 another 
significant change to the decades-old United States Cold War nuclear posture. The Bush 
administration NPR, in support of its New Triad, discusses development and deployment 
of so-called new nuclear and non-nuclear systems, particularly air, sea, and land based 
missile defenses, and maintaining an operational fleet of tankers for thirty five to forty 
years.245 The 2010 NPR, whose deployment policy was heavily driven by New START, 
retired SLCMs.246 The 2018 NPR explains that the objective of strategy in its deployment 
policy is deterrence of non-nuclear and nuclear attack, assurance of partners and allies, 
achieve objectives should deterrence fail, and to hedge against an uncertain future.247 
Another theme each post-Cold War NPR had in common for deployment policy 
was NATO and non-strategic nuclear weapon deployment. The 1994 NPR retained its 
commitment to NATO through DCA and deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe at ten 
percent of Cold War levels.248 In regard to DCA and nuclear weapons in support of NATO, 
the 2001 NPR said, “DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY [fiscal 
year] 02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current 
posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment.”249 The 2010 NPR 
stated that it would retain capabilities for non-strategic nuclear weapons, and that no 
changes would be made without consultation with NATO partners,250 an unprecedented 
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concession by a U.S. president. Lastly, the 2018 NPR points out that forward presence is a 
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IV. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN POST-COLD WAR  
U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY 
The periodic nature of NPRs has provided specific reference points for identifying 
post-Cold War nuclear postures and how U.S. nuclear policies have evolved over time. 
Their timely productions in 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018 have corresponded with the four 
post-Cold War presidential administrations, and along with related documents such as the 
1993 Bottom-Up Review, periodic QDRs, NSSs, and MDRs, they explain United States 
nuclear posture to friends, allies, and foes. NPRs have been met with mixed reactions; some 
have caused controversy and others have incited backlash among United States allies and 
foes alike. The matrix incorporated into this thesis has fashioned a format for comparing 
NPRs side by side, and this chapter will analyze the results to not only put to rest 
misconceptions surrounding the four post-Cold War NPRs, but also to identify pieces of 
United States nuclear posture that have not been clearly reported by the respective 
presidential administrations. 
The evolution of the NPRs themselves as white papers is the first notable evolution 
in this history. Beginning in 1994 as a compilation of press releases252 and most recently 
being released in 2018 as a seventy-four-page, well-formatted report,253 the NPR 
demonstrates the developing public affairs capabilities of the U.S. Government. According 
to Leonidas G. Anthopoulos and Christopher G. Reddick, “Various [strategies] have been 
developed since the late 1990s in an attempt to describe the governmental vision for 
administrative and for societal change, the objectives and priorities with regard to the 
development of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) at national and 
supranational levels.”254 The evolution of technology has led to governments becoming 
more skilled at the ability to market to their audiences and effectively communicate 
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transformations of policies and services.255 One of these skills is catering to the 
developmental needs of the program and considering all perspectives of stakeholders—in 
particular, demand.256 The evolution of the NPR is a prime example of this; the 1994 press 
releases got off topic and became a fragmented release of unclassified material in 2001 that 
eventually became a structured report for the 2010 and 2018 versions of the NPR. NPRs 
also generally provided more details and justifications than each of their respective 
predecessors.257 Post-Cold War NPRs gradually became more detailed and formatted as 
ICT improved, the public relations skills of the U.S. government matured, and the 
importance of nuclear posture reemerged.  
Although the report has remained legislatively mandated, improvements in the 
NPRs’ production shows the relative importance of the document over time—evidenced 
by the production of the NPR becoming more formal and specific. The 1994 NPR was a 
simple collaboration of the DoD and armed services, associated with the Bottom-Up 
Review.258 Over the next twenty-five years, NPRs became closely connected to the QDR, 
End-to-End Review, NSS, and the MDR.259 The motivation behind each report has also 
changed significantly, from planning substantial reductions in 1994,260 to being 
“roadmaps” in the 2001 and 2010 NPRs,261 and finally taking shape as a creed to “ensure 
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that protects the homeland, assures allies, and 
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above all, deters adversaries” in the 2018 NPR.262 The 2018 NPR is even translated on the 
DoD’s webpage into Russian, French, Chinese, and Korean. 
A. DECLARATORY POLICY 
Declaratory policy was the largest section of the matrix. It not only encompassed 
the most topics, it also contained the majority of doctrine-related rhetoric, and provided the 
direct insights into the presidential administrations and the inner workings of the DoD and 
related agencies. General analysis of declaratory policy contained in the matrix revealed 
elements of “retrospective bias,” a term coined by Micah Zenko. According to Zenko, 
“Humans have a tendency to actively forget negative events from long ago, and thus we 
disproportionately judge the past in a more positive light… With benefit of hindsight, the 
past seems relatively predictable and sensible, while the present is always uncertain.”263 
Retrospective bias is progressively evident as the NPRs move further away from the end 
of the Cold War. 
1. Great Power Competition and U.S. Nuclear Force Structure 
Retrospective bias is most easily captured by the theme of great power competition. 
The end of the Cold War was still fresh at the time of production of the 1994 NPR, and the 
general attitude of the press releases and speeches was that of “breathing easy.”264 Then 
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry commented that it was “time to change the way we 
think about nuclear weapons,” that mutually assured destruction was over, and the Clinton 
administration sought to move into a word of mutually assured safety.265 With this shift in 
mind, the 1994 NPR chose only to maintain NC3, intelligence, and critical infrastructure 
systems, and proposed shifting nuclear scientists to the civilian sector.266 
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Nevertheless, by 2001, the Bush administration had already returned to concerns 
over the global threat environment. The 2001 and 2010 NPRs were similar in that neither 
specifically mentioned great power competition; however, each in their own ways sought 
to dissuade the rise of competitors while maintaining a worldwide nuclear balance.267 Each 
of the two reports hailed NC3 as being critical, supported funding for critical infrastructure 
improvements, and recognized the dire need to recruit and transfer knowledge of nuclear 
weapons, supporting, and delivery systems to younger generations.268 Notably, the Obama 
administration NPR had also discussed declining morale within the nuclear complex and 
discussed possible surveillance of nuclear personnel.269 Furthermore, the Obama 
administration was the only presidential administration to contain rhetoric on surveillance 
of nuclear personnel. This fact is interesting because, according to the Reporters’ 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, “In 2009, President Obama promised to create a more 
transparent, whistleblower-friendly environment.”270 Unfortunately, the Obama 
administration did not follow through on this commitment.271 According to the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Obama administration secured more than twenty times the prison 
time for national security leaker-related crimes than all other presidential administrations 
combined.272 On the topic of slipping morale, the 2010 NPR admitted that declining 
morale was due to a “lack of broad, national consensus on the approach to sustaining 
warheads and nuclear technical capabilities.”273 This is hypocritical since the 2010 NPR 
was the first to strenuously push for a world free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
according to Stuart J. Kaufman, the Obama administration was plagued by a more 
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challenging economic situation than the Bush administration, which led to further 
uncertainties in U.S. national security strategy.274 
The 2018 NPR swayed the furthest from the 1994 NPR’s hindsight of the Cold 
War, when it starkly claimed that Russian and Chinese actions were causing a return to 
great power competition.275 The 2018 NPR was also the most dramatic when making its 
declarations; it echoed the importance of NC3 and critical infrastructure.276 On the topic 
of human capital, the 2018 NPR was the first NPR to praise members of the nuclear mission 
for their service and dedication.277 It was also the first to make a public declaration that 
nuclear weapons in fact save lives, and further pushed for technology that would limit 
civilian casualties.278 It went in depth describing a need for investments in personnel and 
allowing exercising of skills.279 The appreciation for nuclear force personnel first 
described in the 2018 NPR actually began under the Obama administration in an initiative 
known as the Force Improvement Program (FIP). According to the Arms Control 
Association, 
In the wake of revelations of professional and ethical lapses and poor  
morale in the U.S. nuclear force, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 
announced in November 2014 steps the department is taking to address the 
numerous setbacks. These include changing the conduct of inspections to 
reduce the burden on airmen and sailors, eliminating micromanagement of 
nuclear personnel seen as overtaxed by excessive bureaucratic and 
administrative requirements, and elevating the head of Air Force Global 
Strike Command, which verses the Air Force’s nuclear forces, from a three- 
to a four-star rank.280 
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General Stephen W. Wilson, then a Lieutenant General and commander of Air 
Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) claimed that the FIP was based on 
recommendations from officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the nuclear 
field and was creating a new culture of empowerment and would lead to restored faith in 
AFGSC.281 Unfortunately, no recent data or research has been uncovered as to the success 
of the FIP. 
The foundation of United States nuclear posture is widely accepted as the nuclear 
triad. The matrix revealed the triad is the strongest paradigm of nuclear policy, it has been 
considered for replacement or reduction by every presidential administration since the end 
of the Cold War. Most administrations considered simply removing one leg of the triad, 
but each NPR apart from the 2001 NPR opted to retain the traditional nuclear triad.282 The 
2001 NPR dramatically attempted to replace the nuclear triad with the so-called “new 
triad,” which merged nuclear and conventional forces;283 however, it failed to fully 
develop the concept. The 1994, 2010, and 2018 NPRs all supported the triad in their own 
ways, generally concurring that it should be efficient, and stipulating that it is the most cost 
effective and strategically sound method of producing deterrence.284 The 2018 NPR goes 
one step further to also note that the nuclear triad is supported by NATO DCA and NC3;285 
however, there is no reason to suspect that the 1994 or 2010 NPRs disagree with this 
statement. The earlier NPRs simply failed to highlight these elements of the U.S. and 
NATO nuclear postures. 
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2. Treaties and Allied Commitments 
On the same level as the nuclear triad, declaratory rhetoric in regard to treaties 
accounted for large portions of all four post-Cold War NPRs. In the nearly three decades 
since the end of the Cold War, treaties have come and passed. NPRs are a fascinating lens 
into the treaty world, particularly the START agreements. START I and START II were 
in the early stages of being conceived at the time of the 1994 NPR.286 Both treaties were 
in full effect at the time of the 2001 NPR’s publishing, and although the Bush 
administration disagreed with the requirements, it still complied.287 The 2010 NPR 
introduced New START to reduce drastically the Moscow Treaty numbers,288 and New 
START was in full force during the 2018 NPR. The Trump administration’s NPR affirmed 
its compliance with New START, and discussed extending or renegotiating the treaty to 
continue after its 2021 expiration.289 
All of the post-Cold War NPRs suggest that arms control treaties, when supporting 
the deterrence needs of the United States, are a positive thing. The 1994, 2001, 2010, and 
2018 NPRs all claim to be complying with treaty requirements.290 Nevertheless, as is the 
case with the CTBT, the last four presidential administrations disagree on what is 
reasonable. The 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs all supported the CTBT; however, this support 
was in varying degrees,291 mostly along party lines. The 1994 NPR did not mention the 
treaty because it had not been conceived yet;292 however, it would be appropriate to 
stipulate that since the treaty was born during the Clinton administration and given the 
support for other nonproliferation programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Program in the 1994 
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NPR,293 the Clinton-era report was written with the CTBT in mind. The 2010 NPR under 
the Obama administration clearly purported its desire to ratify the CTBT,294 whereas the 
2001 and 2018 NPRs under Republican administrations both desired to simply comply and 
support the organization of the treaty in order to retain the United States’ ability to test 
nuclear weapons if needed.295 
The latter two NPRs were platforms for accusing other countries of violating 
treaties. No such issues appear in the 1994 and 2001 NPRs.296 The 2010 NPR accused Iran 
and North Korea of violating the NPT,297 and the 2018 NPR accused Russia of violating 
multiple treaties, particularly the INF.298 The Trump administration was so confident of 
Russia’s failure to comply with the INF that it withdrew from the treaty on August 2nd, 
2019.299  
Despite accusations, withdrawals, and refusals to ratify treaties, all four NPRs 
consistently portray treaties in a positive light. The 1994 NPR hailed the implementation 
of treaties to be of high importance after the Cold War,300 the 2001 NPR claimed that 
transparency was a beneficial aspect of treaties,301 the 2010 NPR proposed an all-new 
treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,302 and the 2018 NPR asserted that treaties and 
arms control efforts contribute to risk reduction through diplomacy, but only if they are 
verifiable and enforceable.303 
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Closely related to treaties, declarations of foreign commitments of the United States 
to allies and NATO partners were also identified by the matrix. The result was 
overwhelmingly consistent between all four post-Cold War NPRs; every single one 
maintained the United States’ commitments without opposition.304 According to Brad 
Roberts, the immediate aftermath of the Cold War caused the interest in NATO strategic 
deterrence to quickly deplete.305 As the Cold War receded further into history, however, 
the matrix revealed an increased concern over NATO. The 2001 NPR proposed a review 
of United States commitment to NATO in FY 2002,306 and the 2010 NPR claims that the 
nuclear threat to NATO is historically low, and leaves an open door to a change in posture 
when it states that, “The role of nuclear weapons in defending [NATO] members will be 
discussed this year in connection with NATO’s revision of its Strategic Concept. Any 
changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within—
and a decision by—[NATO].”307 Notably, the 2010 NPR also spotlights the fact that there 
is no alliance in Asia, but maintains its commitments in the region.308 Lastly, the entire 
2018 NPR contains strong rhetoric in support of the United States’ allies and partners.309 
It claimed that the partnerships and support should be credible and liable, and linked allied 
and NATO commitments to helping to achieve nonproliferation goals.310 Notably, despite 
these statements some of the strongest resistance to the Trump administration NPR claimed 
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that the 2018 NPR put America first and would contribute to a return to great power 
competition.311 
3. Nonproliferation and Worldwide Nuclear Threats 
The evolution of United States nuclear posture is driven by the current worldwide 
threat environment. Consistencies across the four post-Cold War NPRs included concerns 
about Russian nuclear posture and nuclear terrorism, the latter of which grew exponentially 
as the NPRs progressed, particularly in the 2010 and 2018 NPRs. Furthermore, concerns 
over theater threats in Middle East and Asia did not appear until the turn of the century, 
and continued through the most recent NPR. Lastly, the 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs 
all supported nuclear reductions and arms control to varying degrees through a variety of 
programs, treaties, and statements.312 
During the production of the 1994 NPR, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War, the focus was still on Russian and eastern European threats. According to the 1994 
NPR, Russia was still unstable and uncertain, and there were high concerns over so-called 
“loose nukes,” or nuclear weapons unsecured in former USSR states.313 The Clinton 
administration NPR declared that the United States must remain conscious of the way it 
conducted itself because it would influence Russia’s actions, and be wary of the former 
USSR “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands.314 This sentiment proved to be valid, 
as the present posture of the Russian military is largely a reflection of United States posture. 
According to Olga Oliker of the RAND Corporation, “Russia maintains, as it has in the 
past, that it will use military force only defensively, when other options have failed.”315 
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She further states that Russia is seeing the world more perilous than it did before, 
specifically referencing American weapons systems that threaten Russia.316 
The 2001 NPR, released just months after the September 11, 2001 attacks, was the 
first to identify threats of contingency operations, particularly in North Korea, Libya, Iraq, 
Iran, and Syria.317 This new threat is likely what led to the proposed “new triad” in the 
2001 NPR. The Bush administration NPR also maintained the theme of concerns over the 
size and posture of Russian nuclear and conventional forces, and introduced a concern over 
the development of Chinese forces.318 The 2001 NPR surprisingly, given the proximity to 
the 2001 terrorist attacks, did not specifically link terrorists and WMD; however, it did 
state that “Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely 
test America’s security commitments to its allies and friends.”319 The confusion 
surrounding the indirect connection between WMD and terrorists could also be due to the 
introduction of the new triad. 
The 2010 NPR further declared that Russia and China were the primary nuclear 
threats to the United States, but it was the first to offer more explanation.320 It claimed that 
United States and Russian relations were good, that the United States must reduce the 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthen International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards, and impede and enforce consequences for nuclear trade.321 The 2010 
NPR created a rift in theme analysis when it became the first NPR to declare countering 
nuclear terrorism as the first policy priority, and offered a detailed approach to preventing 
the growing threat.322 Most notably, the 2010 NPR commented that the United States and 
China were becoming increasingly interdependent,323 which is contrary to United States’ 
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recent claims that China is a threat. According to Eswar Prasad and Grace Gu, “China 
would like to tear itself away from the U.S. Treasury market but faces the prospect of a big 
capital loss on its large accumulated stock of holdings if U.S. Treasury bond prices were 
to rise or if the renminbi eventually appreciated in value against the U.S. dollar.”324 
Many scholars agree that a war with China is unlikely due to these economic 
entanglements; however, there is still concern over nuclear escalation if the United States 
were ever to engage in a conventional war with China. According to Caitlin Talmadge, 
conflicting viewpoints make an assessment of the threat of Chinese escalation difficult.325 
Talmadge remarks that, 
This impasse has two main sources. One is the lack of systematic, open-
source military-technical analysis of the extent to which plausible U.S. 
conventional military operations are likely to threaten China’s nuclear 
retaliatory capability. The other is a failure to incorporate perceptual 
variables that are likely to shape both how China will view threats  
to its nuclear arsenal after conventional deterrence fails and the purposes 
that China might believe nuclear escalation could serve under such 
conditions.326 
Therefore, China, despite its economic interdependencies with the United States, 
should be considered a threat when assessing nuclear posture. 
The 2018 NPR echoed the 2010 NPR’s concerns over China’s allegedly expanding 
nuclear capability, and took one step further to declare Russia was doing the same.327 It 
continued the theme of twenty-first century NPRs by voicing concerns about North Korea 
and Iran, and was the first to offer tailored strategies for countering particular threats.328 
Furthermore, it was the first to share concerns over cyber threats and voice concern over 
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uncertainty and potential unanticipated threats;329 these alarmist statements are interesting 
because the 2018 NPR contained more procurement policy statements than any other NPR. 
The 2018 NPR upheld the 2010 NPR’s newly created theme of countering nuclear 
terrorism; however, the majority of the NPR was focused on foreign, state-based threats.330 
The 2018 NPR linked the two, much like the 2001 and 2010 NPRs by indicating that, “The 
United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor 
that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices.”331 
Each one of the four post-Cold War NPRs included rhetoric that indicated a theme 
of nuclear reductions and arms control.332 The extent and method of these efforts varied, 
particularly in the first two NPRs. NPRs released under Democratic administrations were 
more passionate about nonproliferation than NPRs released during Republican 
administrations, which took a more realist stance. The 1994 NPR was primarily concerned 
with the aforementioned USSR “loose nukes,” and advocated for the Nunn-Lugar Program, 
hastening START I, START II, and future treaty negotiations, and supporting UN and 
international nonproliferation efforts.333 The 2001 NPR stood out from the rest; it only 
mentioned the reduction actions the United States was taking with its own nuclear 
arsenal.334 The lapse could be explained, however, by the fact that only the unclassified 
portions of the 2001 NPR were released. However, according to Brad Roberts, the Bush 
administration was inconsistent when producing nonproliferation policy in its first few 
years.335 The 2010 NPR is the most aggressive nonproliferation NPR yet; it introduced the 
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term “nuke-zero,” or a world free of nuclear weapons.336 It declared that the United States 
would not test or develop new warheads, increase funding for the NNSA, and enforce 
consequences for NPT non-compliance.337 The 2018 NPR further supported the NPT and 
CTBT, and echoed support for a world free of not only nuclear, but chemical and biological 
weapons as well.338 The 2018 NPR was not as dramatic as the 2010 NPR; it declared that 
the United States must be realistic to worldwide threats.339 The Trump administration NPR 
did state, however, that it would increase transparency and predictability to avoid 
miscalculations by other nuclear states, and that it supports treaties that are verifiable  
and enforceable.340 
B. PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Procurement policy and declaratory policy go hand-in-hand. Procurement policy is 
made up of statements in NPRs about what the presidential administration plans to acquire 
with regard to nuclear weapons and their associated systems. These acquisitions are 
determined based on an assessment of the current worldwide threat environment against 
the current capabilities of the United States nuclear arsenal. The 1994 NPR set a downward 
trend at the end of the Cold War by shifting priority away from investing in nuclear 
weapons systems and technologies. This shift led to the United States’ nuclear arsenal 
falling behind the rest of the world, and a theme among the 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs to 
focus on the defense industrial base and reinvesting in the U.S. nuclear posture. 
Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, there is a dire need to invest in 
the defense of the United States. According to Christian Brose, 
If ever there was a time to get serious about the coming revolution in 
military affairs, it is now. There is an emerging consensus that the United 
States’ top defense-planning priority should be contending with great 
powers with advanced militaries, primarily China, and that new 
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technologies, once intriguing but speculative, are now both real and 
essential to future military advantage. Senior military leaders and defense 
experts are also starting to agree, albeit belatedly, that when it comes to 
these threats, the United States is falling dangerously behind.341 
The United States nuclear arsenal is a cost-effective means of keeping up to par with the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, the majority of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is within the United 
States, recycling money spent on nuclear defense back into the U.S. economy. For 
example, Malmstrom Air Force base, a USAF ICBM base in Great Falls, Montana 
contributes greatly to the local economy. According to the City of Great Falls Planning and 
Community Development Department, “the military’s importance to the local Great Falls 
economy is significant and far reaching.”342 The City of Great Falls Planning and 
Community Development Department stated, 
According to the Fiscal Year 2009 Economic Impact Report, Malmstrom 
Air Force Base created an estimated 1,490 indirect jobs and had at total 
economic impact to the region of $434 million. This included a total annual 
payroll of $222 million, total annual expenditures of $162 million, and an 
estimated annual job value of $50 million. In 2012, total military and 
civilian wages in Great Falls was $206 million. Expenditures for 
construction, services, materials, equipment and supplies in 2012 were 
approximately $69 million. In 2012, the contribution of indirect jobs was 
estimated to be approximately $62 million. Collectively the total estimated 
impact of Malmstrom Air Force Base to the City was $337 million in 2012. 
These numbers indicate some yearly adjustments but nonetheless 
underscore the impressive contribution of the military to the City’s 
economy. In fact, it has been estimated by the University of Montana’s 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research Department that the local 
impact of the military in Great Falls represents 46% of the City’s 
economy.343 
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This number is simply the direct impact of Malmstrom Air Force Base; therefore, if it were 
not for the nuclear mission of the USAF, Great Falls, Montana would most likely shrink to 
less than half its current size, creating a significant problem for the city’s economy. 
The spending for fiscal year 2018 on United States nuclear weapons is estimated 
by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments to be just under $20 billion.344 The 
current spending reported by the Congressional Budget Office for fiscal year 2018 for the 
entire U.S. Government is $4.1 trillion.345 This means nuclear deterrence today costs the 
U.S. Government less than half of a percent of the total federal budget. Although the DoD 
handles the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stewardship of nuclear deployed 
facilities, it is the DOE that owns nuclear weapons; they not only own, but also repair and 
maintain the current nuclear weapon stockpile, and is the sole developer for new nuclear 
warheads. The current budget for the DOE is roughly $10 billion.346 All of this money 
simultaneously supports the American economy and provides a baseline deterrent for not 
only the United States, but her allies as well. 
1. Warheads and Delivery Systems 
Identifiable trends in warhead and delivery system procurement did not emerge 
until the 2001 NPR. The two primary trends that emerged were development of new 
delivery vehicles, and aggressive sustainment programs for the current fleet of warheads 
and delivery vehicles while waiting for the new systems to be developed. Development of 
new warheads was also an identifiable trend; however, the 2010 NPR prioritized placing 
sustainment over development and the 1994 NPR specifically stated it would not develop 
new warheads at all.347 The level of investment in developing and acquiring new delivery 
vehicles seemed to follow party lines; the 1994 and 2010 NPRs under Democratic 
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presidential administrations were not as aggressive as the 2001 and 2018 NPRs under 
Republican presidential administrations.348 
The 1994 NPR and the Clinton administration no longer saw a need to invest 
significantly in development of nuclear weapons and their associated systems. The report 
limited the number of delivery system acquisitions and upgrades, and stated that it would 
not produce any new-design warheads—it would only maintain the current fleet.349 These 
limits are understandable, considering the size of the United States’ Cold War surplus. By 
the announcement of the 2001 NPR, however, the need for new bombers, ICBMs, and 
SLBMs was becoming apparent. The 2001 NPR sought to begin exploring replacement 
options for ICBMs immediately, replace the current SLBM by 2029, and bombers by 2040, 
sustaining the current bomber fleet with an aggressive modernization program,350 setting 
a schedule that was shadowed by the following two NPRs. Due to the changing threat 
environment, the 2001 NPR also was seeking a ground-penetrating nuclear weapon and an 
agent-defeat weapon351—both proposals unique to the Bush administration NPR. The 
2010 NPR only continued research into delivery vehicles, and de-prioritized any plans for 
developing new warheads.352 The 2018 NPR, trending with the 2001 NPR, placed rapid 
development of delivery systems as a top priority.353 It proposed aggressive plans to 
expand the nuclear triad, making it more flexible and responsive.354 It further sought to 
develop new and sustain in-service warheads, including development of a low-yield 
SLBM, a common warhead for ballistic missiles, and supported gravity bomb alterations 
to fit the warhead on multiple airframes.355 
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According to the Arms Control Association, six months after the publication of the 
2018 NPR, the current DoD modernization programs were to modernize and replace the 
Minuteman III ICBM with the GBSD, which includes associated launch control and 
command and control facilities, modernize the B-2 and B-52H, research and develop the 
B-21 LRSO, replace the ALCM with a long-range standoff cruise missile on board the 
LRSO, replace the Ohio-Class SSBN with the Columbia Class SSBN, and modernize and 
extend the life of the Trident II D-5 SLBM.356 According to William J. Broad and David 
E. Sanger, “The price tag of President Trump’s vision of remaking the American nuclear 
arsenal has soared… as a new government estimate put the cost of a 30-year makeover at 
$1.2 trillion, more than 20 percent higher than earlier figures.”357 This figure could be 
considered biased because many of these plans had been in the works before President 
Trump took office. The price tag also does not account for inflation over the next thirty 
years, which may be in excess of $1.6 trillion.358 Figure 3 breaks down the cost of all the 
current programs to modernize the United States nuclear fleet. 
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Figure 3. Estimated costs for nuclear triad modernization.359 
2. NC3 and Critical Infrastructure 
Trends identified in the four post-Cold War NPRs that regarded NC3 and nuclear 
critical infrastructure were similar to those of weapons and delivery systems. The first post-
Cold War NPR in 1994 largely disregarded NC3 and critical infrastructure by largely 
omitting it from the report, yet this policy emerged as having dire consequences reflected 
in the 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs. The initial lapse in funding immediately following the 
Cold War set NC3 and nuclear critical infrastructure back behind the rest of the world, and 
the twenty-first century NPRs all concurred that funding and attention must be returned. 
The 1994 NPR mentioned no procurement intent for any new NC3 systems, and 
simply planned to sustain elements of the defense industrial base.360 By the turn of the 
century, this error had become evident. The 2001 NPR sought substantial investment in 
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communications systems and development of new, particularly space-based, NC3 
systems.361 It further defended the need to pursue revitalization and restoration for the 
nuclear weapons production and infrastructure complexes to develop and produce new 
warheads should the need arise.362 The 2010 NPR further pursued initiatives to improve 
NC3 and modernize nuclear critical infrastructure;363 however, the Obama administration 
NPR was less dramatic than its predecessor, maintaining the theme of Democratic 
presidential administrations being less aggressive with their procurement policies. The 
2018 NPR also maintained itself as the most assertive NPR yet with regard to procurement 
policy; it solicited for several programs to strengthen, enhance, sustain, upgrade, improve, 
advance, reform, explore, fund, ensure, reconstitute, and integrate both NC3 and nuclear 
critical infrastructure.364 
The first three post-Cold War NPRs also had notable solicitations that did not fit 
into any theme or trend. The 1994 NPR lobbied for the Nunn-Lugar Program and funding 
for nuclear accident and incident teams,365 complicit with the Clinton administration’s 
NPR focusing on Cold War draw-down rather than future threat posture. The 2001 NPR 
defined a need for a new nuclear intelligence system and air tanker program366—programs 
that would supplement NC3 and critical infrastructure, and the bomber delivery systems, 
respectively. Lastly, the 2010 NPR recommended focusing on the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program to further sustain all aspects of U.S. nuclear posture for years to come.367 
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C. EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
General Nathan F. Twining once said, “If our Air Forces are never used, they have 
achieved their finest goal.”368 The matrix identified deterrence as the most important 
employment policy of nuclear weapons. All the other paradigms of nuclear employment 
policy—the way presidential administrations use nuclear weapons to achieve a certain 
objective—all support some form of nuclear deterrence. According to the Smithsonian 
Institute, deaths from war have been in decline since the end of World War II.369 Further, 
the world is becoming a safer place,370 possibly connected to the decline in significant 
conflict since WWII. High-intensity conflicts (such as the Korean War or Vietnam War) 
are down by more than half since the end of the Cold War.371 The absence of war has 
caused terrorism, genocide, and even seemingly unrelated homicide numbers to fall 
throughout the world.372 These declines have been theorized to be a result of the past 
development, continued deployment, and continued potential use of nuclear weapons 
which has led to a less violent world. 
Employment policy trends identified by the matrix across the four post-Cold War 
NPRs were generally consistent. The 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs all agreed to 
varying degrees the importance of the nuclear triad, deterrence, avoiding complacency, and 
improving and developing capabilities to stay on-par with threats, even when pursuing a 
world free of nuclear weapons. 
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1. Active Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Defense 
All four post-Cold War NPRs agreed that deterrence was a foundation of defense 
and, in their own ways, that it must be balanced, credible, and flexible.373 Furthermore, 
each agreed that the Cold War posture was obsolete.374 Offensive and defensive 
employment policy themes and trends identified by the matrix varied in terms of the “how” 
element, but the “why” remained the same. Safety and security of the United States was 
the top priority, but each NPR had its own methods and suggested its own changes to the 
U.S. nuclear posture to accomplish these priorities. The most prominent theme that did 
emerge, however, was that of missile defense. NATO Notably, first-use policies were 
largely ignored, with the exception of the 2018 NPR. 
The 1994 NPR introduced a balance of safety and security.375 It began a trend of 
merging offensive capabilities with defensive ones, particularly early warning, threat 
assessments, dissemination to decision-makers, and effective force management.376 Since 
the 1994 NPR immediately followed the darkness of the Cold War, this meant substantial 
reductions that set the stage for the next three decades of United States nuclear posture. 
The 1994 NPR took away nuclear weapons custody from ground forces, took strategic 
bombers off alert and retired nuclear weapons from the naval surface fleet.377 It also set a 
foundation for developing theater defenses for ballistic missile defense, and warned future 
Americans to not become complacent.378 
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The 2001 NPR continues the trend of effective force management set by the 1994 
NPR. Even though the “new triad” was revolutionary and ultimately failed, it simply was 
an attempt to shape the U.S. nuclear posture to the current threats at the turn of the century. 
The Bush administration NPR shifted away from offensive forces as the sole means of 
deterrence by incorporating defensive forces into deterrence alongside offensive 
capabilties. The first leg of its “new triad” paired ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers with 
nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.379 Defensively, the second leg of the “new triad” 
consisted of active and passive defenses.380 The 2001 NPR was the first emergence of 
land-, air-, and sea-based missile defenses in an NPR,381 a trend that would be continued 
in 2010 and 2018. The 2001 NPR confidently proclaimed that defense would dissuade,382 
a statement echoed particularly in the 2018 NPR. Missile defense is also an emerging 
priority of NATO, according to Jacek Durkalec, it was elevated in 2010 to become a core 
element in NATO’s collective defense.383 
The 2010 NPR was the first to highlight that credibility characterized deterrence.384 
The 2010 NPR, in line with its declaration that countering nuclear proliferation by terrorists 
was the number one priority, favored a nuclear posture much different from the Cold War 
posture.385 Even though the other three NPRs agree that the Cold War posture is outdated, 
the Obama administration NPR was much more dramatic with these statements. The 2010 
NPR also focused on safety and maximizing presidential decision-making time, and, like 
the 2001 NPR, referenced the growth of the United States’ “unrivaled” conventional 
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forces.386 The 2010 NPR also concurred with the 2001 NPR by improving missile 
defenses, stating that they are a cause for concern to China and Russia.387 
The 2018 NPR, coinciding with its claims of a worldwide return to great power 
competition, focused on ensuring enemies did not miscalculate the consequences of nuclear 
use in addition to placing even more emphasis on defense than its predecessors. The Trump 
administration NPR claims that, “Potential adversaries must understand that: 1) the United 
States is able to identify them and hold them accountable for acts of aggression, including 
new forms of aggression; 2) we will defeat non-nuclear strategic attacks; and, 3) any 
nuclear escalation will fail to achieve their objectives, and will instead result in 
unacceptable consequences for them.”388 It further held that capabilities must be flexible 
in order to achieve tailored deterrence, and was the first NPR to offer strategies for 
deterrence specific to certain threats.389 The 2018 NPR was the first to definitively state 
that a first-use policy was inappropriate given the current word threat environment,390 a 
topic none of the other three NPRs covered. The 2018 NPR did, however, continue hailing 
missile defenses as the best option if deterrence failed.391 
Realists would argue that the sentiment of increased missile defenses could have 
potentially caused China and Russia to further their capabilities. According to the 2019 
Missile Defense Review (MDR), “For the past 17 years, the United States has devoted 
significant effort to developing and deploying a layered missile defense system… With 
further planned investments, these improvements will continue well into the future.”392 
The 2019 MDR also states that the current threat environment is higher than in years past 
and calls for a new approach.393 Realist international relations theory is based on the 
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concept of power as opposed to vulnerability. For example, the end of the Cold War is a 
challenge for realists to explain. According to Richard Lebow, the end of the Cold War 
creates a serious problem in the realist community.394 Lebow observes that, “Some realists 
contend ex post facto that Soviet foreign policy after 1985 was not inconsistent with realist 
theories and is a logical and long overdue response to the Soviet Union’s economic 
decline.”395 He continues that this concept is disagreeable, and argues that, “Soviet foreign 
policy had been living beyond its means for a long time.”396 Perhaps Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
actions in response to the economic situation in the USSR were a function of self-
preservation, which would be consistent with realism. Current events, which include 
Russia strengthening and modernizing its arsenal, could suggest that the Soviet move for 
globalization in the late 1980s was just an effort to buy time. Lebow insists that, “Realists 
maintain that the [end of the Cold War] is illusory. In the absence of a hierarchical structure, 
humankind is doomed to repeat endlessly the cycle of expansion and decline and war and 
renewal.”397 Now, nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, the Russians have 
had their time to build themselves back up to counter, and continue to counter, any 
advances in United States nuclear posture, conventional capability, or missile defense. 
2. Nontraditional Role of Nuclear Weapons 
The four post-Cold War NPRs also contained an unexpected theme for employment 
of nuclear weapons. The matrix uncovered a category of rhetoric encompassing countering 
chemical and biological weapons. The 1994 NPR stood out from the other three by only 
stating that the United States must improve its real time detection capabilities for agents.398 
However, the 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs all discussed the actual employment of nuclear 
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weapons themselves to counter CBW threats;399 however, the extent of the rhetoric 
followed party lines. The 2001 NPR, under a Republican administration, sought to produce 
an Agent-Defeat Weapon (ADW) to help deter CBW threats and assure U.S. allies.400 The 
2010 NPR, under a Democratic administration, claimed that the role of nuclear weapons in 
deterring CBW attacks was declining, and desired to focus on conventional deterrence.401 
The 2018 NPR, produced during the Republican administration of President Trump, did 
not directly correlate countering CBWs as a mission of nuclear weapons, however the 
report repeated that CBWs were a significant threat.402 The report did state that, “We will, 
for example, hedge against the potential rapid growth or emergence of nuclear and non-
nuclear strategic threats, including chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale 
conventional aggression.”403 
D. DEPLOYMENT POLICY 
Deployment policy as defined by the matrix is the quantity and placement of 
nuclear weapons and their associated systems to achieve the desired employment policy 
objectives. The trends uncovered correlated closely to not only employment policy, but 
declaratory policy as well. The actual number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems 
deployed is a direct reflection of treaties and agreements, particularly START I, START 
II, and the most recent New START, as seen in Figure 4. Procurement policy can also be 
related to deployment policy; however, since treaties are what limit the actual number of 
deployed resources, any procurement intent would not affect the number of deployed 
nuclear weapons or systems, it would only affect the advanced technical or type of delivery 
system or warhead. Common sense would indicate that careful consideration of threat and 
capability also contributes to deployment policy, however all four post-Cold War NPRs 
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lack specific details on why certain systems are actively deployed rather than others,404 
since the START treaties in particular do not necessary limit type of delivery vehicle, only 
the total number of delivery vehicles. The 2018 NPR broke this mold to some extent, but 
still refrained from providing detailed information.405 This information most likely resides 
at the classified level and will not be released to the public. 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between treaties and stockpile numbers406 
1. Nuclear Triad Delivery Systems 
The nuclear triad consists of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear bombers. Throughout 
the nearly three decades since the end of the Cold War, presidential administrations have 
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often suggested either removing one leg of the triad or reorganizing it altogether. These 
trends were not necessarily indicated in the NPRs themselves. The 2001 NPR, as 
previously mentioned, attempted to dramatically reform the triad into the Bush 
administration’s so-called “new triad.”407 The 2010 NPR stated it had considered 
removing one leg of the triad, but decided against this plan.408 According to William J. 
Broad and David E. Sanger, President Obama, in the beginning of his term as president of 
the United States, had been focused on reducing the role of the nuclear arsenal in American 
offensive and defensive strategy.409 Yet, toward the end of President Obama’s term, he 
not only decided against removing one leg of the nuclear triad, but also opted to keep active 
American nuclear weapon deployment at about 1,000 warheads despite the contradictory 
advice of his top nuclear political strategists.410 The 2018 NPR said that it would replace 
the nuclear triad;411 however, the context of the report as aggressive in its procurement 
policy for new ICBM, SLBM, and bomber warheads, delivery systems, and support 
systems412 indicates that the report’s desire to replace the triad meant it would simply be 
modernizing the technology that makes up the triad, rather than accomplishing a ground-
up restructure like what was proposed in the 2001 NPR. Furthermore, Broad and Sanger 
allege that Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis changed his stance on ICBMs from being a 
skeptic of land-based nuclear missiles at the beginning of his tenure to saying he believes 
they are necessary to preserve at the time of the 2018 NPR’s production.413 
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All four post-Cold War NPRs had a downward trend for ICBMs.414 The 1994 NPR 
said that there would be 450–500 Minuteman III ICBMs carrying single warheads, even 
though there were many more ICBMs than this on alert at the time of publishing.415 By 
the 2001 NPR, the projected number of Minuteman III ICBMs was still 500, yet the 
Peacekeeper ICBM had not yet been retired, something the Bush administration report 
claimed to change by 2012.416 According to the Arms Control Association, it achieved this 
on September 19th, 2005 to comply with START II.417 At the time of production of the 
2010 NPR, Minuteman III ICBMs had still not been de-MIRVed, but there were only 450 
ICBMs on alert.418 The 2018 NPR hailed the Minuteman III ICBM as the most responsive 
and survivable deployed leg, claimed it would continue open-ocean targeting, and claimed 
that there were 400 single warhead ICBMs spread between 450 silos.419 It broke the trend 
of secrecy, stating that ICBMs hold Eurasia at risk by being prompt, accurate, and 
flexible.420 
In terms of SSBNs, each post-Cold War NPR considered changes to the fleet 
size.421 These changes trended to follow party lines. The Democratic 1994 NPR reduced 
the fleet from eighteen to fourteen,422 the Republican 2001 NPR maintained the fleet size 
and considered reconstituting the four retired submarines to transport special operations 
forces,423 and the Democratic 2010 NPR further considered reducing the SSBN fleet to 
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twelve but retained fourteen for the time being.424 The Republican 2018 NPR did not 
provide a specific number of active SSBNs, but also made no indication that it would 
change the size of the Ohio-Class fleet, but did indicate that the Columbia-Class SSBN 
would replace the Ohio-Class fleet upon completion.425 It hailed SSBNs, much like 
ICBMs, as having no known credible threats and being able to hold Eurasian targets at 
risk.426 
Deployment of nuclear bombers as indicated by the four post-Cold War NPRs was 
erratic but trended downward. The 1994 NPR reoriented the role of the B-1 to conventional 
and planned to reduce the B-52 fleet to a total of sixty-six.427 The 2001 NPR did not 
provide a specific number of deployed bombers, it only stated that it planned for seventy-
six B-52s and twenty-one B-2s to be active in 2012.428 At the time of production of the 
2010 NPR, the number of B-52s was at the target of the Bush administration; however, the 
Obama administration planned to consider transitioning some of these to a conventional 
mission.429 The 2010 NPR also identified eighteen B-1s in current service.430 The 2018 
NPR, much like with ICBMs and SSBNs, stood out from the pack by confirming bombers 
as flexible and visible, stating they had multiple warhead options and could be used as a 
show of force.431 It stated that there were forty-six B-52s and twenty B-2s supported by 
refueling aircraft; and noted that they are not maintained on a day-to-day alert.432 
Figure 5 shows the combined United States nuclear forces after the end of the Cold 
War. In accordance with the START agreements, warhead numbers are not specific to a 
delivery vehicle, and launchers are considered ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. 
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Figure 5. United States nuclear forces post-Cold War.433 
2. Non-Triad Delivery Systems 
The matrix suggested that nuclear deployment policy that did not fall under the 
nuclear triad was tactical rather than strategic. This included NATO DCA and other Naval 
and ground-force nuclear options, as well as supporting functions. 
The most dramatic changes to non-strategic nuclear weapons forces were outlined 
in the 1994 NPR in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It vowed to eliminate carrier-
based DCA, removed nuclear weapons custody from ground forces, and eliminated the 
option to carry nuclear weapons on naval surface ships.434 The 2001 NPR made no 
mention of a naval surface nuclear capability,435 but the 2010 NPR declared it would 
remove this capability,436 indicating it had may or may not have been accomplished by 
that time, the 2010 NPR was not specific and could have been referring to Tomahawk 
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Missiles. The 2018 NPR made no mention of surface naval nuclear capability;437 however, 
in the immediate timeframe of the Trump administration NPR’s release, the 
USSTRATCOM commander made comments indicating his desire to arm surface ships 
with a nuclear cruise missile, most notably the Zumwalt-class destroyer.438 
Support for NATO DCA was maintained throughout the four post-Cold War 
NPRs.439 The 2010 NPR claimed consideration of changes would have to be approved by 
NATO partners,440 indicating the Obama administration was considering a shift, even 
though the 2010 report did not criticize NATO DCA. The 1994 NPR reflected reductions 
in NATO DCA and deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe to ten percent of Cold War 
numbers,441 understandable in the immediate aftermath of the decades-long conflict and 
the continuing arms control agreements. The 2001 NPR simply maintained its 
commitment,442 while the 2018 NPR held that forward presence was a requirement.443 
The 2001 NPR stood apart from the pack in terms of illustrations about nuclear 
mission support functions. Although mentioned sparsely in the 1994, 2010, and 2018 
NPRs, the topic was largely ignored.444 The 2001 NPR’s proposal of the “new-triad,” 
which included those conventional and non-conventional forces, is what delineated it from 
the rest. In particular, the 2001 NPR included deployment of airborne tankers and 
development of new nuclear and non-nuclear systems, particularly for missile defense, as 
part of its “new triad.”445 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The development and employment of the nuclear weapons has permanently 
changed the atmosphere of international politics. Since the inception of nuclear weapons 
at the end of World War II, statesmen, primarily from the United States and the United 
Socialist Soviet Republics, now known as the Russian Federation, have been challenged to 
understand the role these weapons play in international relations between superpowers. 
History shows an unpredictable Cold War was filled with theories and strategies 
surrounding the development, employment, stockpiling, use, and stewardship of nuclear 
weapons. Although misinterpreted throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
role of nuclear strategy eventually was understood by the great powers and has led to a 
drastic reduction in worldwide conflict and wartime death. All this considered, nuclear 
weapons had a positive role in the outcome of the Cold War, which has led to positive 
changes to modern conflict, making it less likely to occur. 
The United States NPR has become a staple of modern post-Cold War nuclear 
policy. It has provided a crucial insight to not only American policymakers, but to assuring 
our allies and deterring our foes. It has evolved in accordance with increased understanding 
of public relations and technological advancements enabling wider dispersal of white 
papers. Most importantly, the four post-Cold War NPRs have become lenses to identify 
trends in U.S. nuclear posture. 
The role of nuclear weapons, despite being a catalyst in the beginning of the Cold 
War, has proven to be overall positive. In their beginnings, the implications of the atomic 
bomb were understood by neither the Americans nor the Soviets. Much like slavery was 
not the cause of the American Civil War, rather the intention was to keep the country 
together, the nuclear weapon was not the cause of the Cold War. It was a substance which 
fueled the differences between the United States and the USSR in the post-WWII struggle 
for world control between the Great Powers. Stalin underappreciated the atomic bomb as 
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a weapon, and Roosevelt and Truman underestimated its use as a tool of negotiation.446 
Neither the United States nor the USSR appropriately negotiated their desires after WWII 
had ended, and eventually leaned on the newly developed nuclear weapon as their means 
of holding onto or claiming power. 
Nuclear deterrence has had many different meanings since its inception. Originally 
implying mutually assured destruction and favoring quantity of nuclear attack over quality, 
nuclear strategy quickly shifted from massive destruction to specifically targeted 
economic, military, and socially strategic targets. Presently, nuclear deterrence is 
characterized by mutually assured safety, and still makes up a small but important part of 
the U.S. DoD and is likely to never disappear. The deterrent factor of the threat of nuclear 
weapon use in the great power struggle of the Cold War directly contributed to the peaceful 
resolution, as well as the ever-declining amount of conflict and subsequent casualties in 
the present day worldwide. 
A. IDENTIFIED TRENDS 
A literature review of scholarly reactions to NPRs revealed a failure of the scholarly 
community to examine NPRs side by side to discover trends. The matrix this thesis 
incorporated has identified a significant number of notable trends in U.S. nuclear policy. 
The evolution of the NPR itself to become more formal and specific is a notable and 
important trend. It indicates that nuclear weapons are still an important part of American 
politics, and the U.S. Government values transparency and is taking public relations 
seriously.447 Declaratory policy was the longest and most inclusive theme identified by 
the matrix, consistent with the role of the NPR as a white paper. Priorities typically 
followed Republican and Democratic party lines; however, a world free of nuclear weapons 
was generally stipulated as a goal in each NPR, despite the party affiliation of the 
administration. Aggressiveness of procurement policy had the most identifiable bias 
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between liberal and conservative administrations; NPRs released by Republican 
administrations were much more aggressive in this paradigm than NPRs released by 
Democratic administrations. The 2001 NPR sought a ground-penetrating nuclear weapon 
and the 2018 NPR campaigned for aggressive development programs for warheads and 
delivery systems to compete with the times, when the 2010 NPR released under a 
Democratic administration had only focused its energy on pandering for life-improvement 
programs for current capabilities. 
A theme generally agreed upon by all four of the post-Cold War NPRs was that the 
Cold War was in the past, with the exception of the 2018 NPR that declared the world is 
experiencing a return to great power competition.448 The reason for the discrepancy in the 
2018 NPR is that Chinese and Russian behavior had become more aggressive in the 
meantime. According to Brad Roberts, 
Since the end of the Cold War, leaders of each U.S. presidential 
administration have sought to remake the political relationship with Russia 
in a way that reduces and ultimately eliminates as one of it defining 
elements of the Cold War – vintage nuclear balance of terror. The Clinton 
administration talked about moving away from mutual assured destruction 
(MAD) as the basis toward mutual assured security. The George W. Bush 
administration talked about moving nuclear weapons out of the foreground 
and into the background of the political relationship. The Obama 
administration attempted to “reset” the political relationship in part by 
shifting the focus away from mutual deterrence and onto shared interests in 
strategic stability and a stronger nonproliferation regime. It also sought to 
stimulate broader discussion of the requirements of mutual assured 
stability.449 
Unfortunately, Russia did not follow suit.450 All the administrations agreed that 
deterrence was the most important mission of U.S. nuclear forces, and generally agreed 
that it must be credible, balanced, and flexible. The NPRs agreed that a strategic nuclear 
triad was the greatest way to achieve this level of deterrence; however, the triad was highly 
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scrutinized. The 2001 NPR under the Bush administration attempted to radically  
change the triad to incorporate conventional forces and defenses.451 Although the other 
three NPRs did not alter the triad, behind-the-scenes activities constantly questioned  
the necessity of each of the legs. Ultimately, ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear bombers  
are all maintained as the most cost-effective and strategically-sound methods of  
producing deterrence. 
Nuclear critical infrastructure, NC3 systems, and personnel were themes that 
exponentially tended to increase in importance as the NPRs were published. The 1994 NPR 
under the Clinton administration dramatically reduced funding and procurement plans for 
critical infrastructure and NC3, and unveiled plans to retire nuclear personnel into the 
civilian sector.452 This mistake was realized by the 2001 NPR, the first to indicate that 
ignoring critical infrastructure and NC3 systems had caused those systems to fall behind 
the times, and that people with critical nuclear skills must be given the opportunities to 
exercise these skills.453 The call for increased attention to nuclear critical infrastructure, 
NC3 systems, and personnel gradually became more dramatic through the 2001, 2010, and 
2018 NPRs. 
The nuclear posture of the United States was consistently based on the perceived 
threat worldwide and treaty agreements. Russia tended to be a primary concern across all 
four post-Cold War NPRs, but nuclear terrorism and threats from Middle Eastern and Asian 
states, particularly Iran, North Korea, and China, were consistent trends throughout the 
three NPRs after the turn of the century. Despite rhetoric that indicated connections to 
political affiliation of presidential administrations, the 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018 NPRs 
all favored diplomacy over conflict, and support for treaties as a means of arms control was 
consistent. They agreed that treaties and agreements are effective when enforceable, but 
this is where the NPRs diverged. Democratic NPRs tended to reflect a more idealistic view 
of the world, for example the Obama administration supported ratification of the CTBT 
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and failed to properly enforce the INF Treaty.454 NPRs published by Republican 
administrations were more realist, such as the Trump administration claiming it would not 
ratify the CTBT455 and eventually withdrawing from the INF treaty.456 
Employment and deployment policy themes also tended to be based on the 
perceived worldwide threat and treaty agreements. For example, missile defense emerged 
rapidly after the turn of the century, eventually breaking off to form its own comprehensive 
reviews modeled much like the NPRs.457 Actual deployment of nuclear triad delivery 
systems was directly connected to treaties and agreements, in particular the START 
accords. The last of the identifiable trends is that support for NATO was maintained by all 
four post-Cold War NPRs; however, as NPRs became more recent, the role the United 
States plays in the alliance came into question. 
Other themes relating to declaratory, procurement, employment, and deployment 
policy were explored. However, these themes did not produce many significant or 
identifiable themes, such as the non-traditional roles of nuclear weapons in the paradigm 
of employment policy. NPRs all had differentiating perspectives on the role of nuclear 
weapons to counter chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, several topics were 
generally left out of the four post-Cold War NPRs, most notably cyber threats, hypersonic 
capabilities, and the emergence of space as a battleground. These technologies were still in 
infancy at the end of the Cold War but have emerged to become major political talking 
points in present day. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the importance of public relations continues to emerge, NPRs should continue 
to be published periodically in accordance with major changes in the world and transitions 
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of presidential administrations. They provide important insight to the American public, 
politicians, military leadership, and scholars, assure our allies, and, as mentioned in the 
2018 NPR, prevent miscalculation by our foes.458 Presidential administrations wishing to 
publish NPRs must consider how the media and foreign states will respond. Since the 
beginning of its development in 1993, evolution of the NPR has revealed an emergent 
intent to appeal to the general public. A thorough understanding of the influential 
relationships between the NPR, the media, and public opinion will lead the DoD and future 
presidential administrations to produce an NPR that accurately embodies the United States’ 
nuclear requirements while simultaneously addressing the concerns of the general public. 
Furthermore, Major General Mark Hertling, co-author of “The Military-Media 
Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage?” explains that, “what [journalists] might be 
reporting to the American people will soon end up on foreign websites, and will influence 
our adversaries.”459 Literature reviewed by this thesis uncovered gaps in the DoD and 
Presidential administrations’ considerations the implications of U.S. NPRs on other states; 
therefore, future NPRs, in addition to being mindful of how U.S. media will frame the 
report, must also place considerations of how foreign outlets will frame the report as a high 
priority. 
Future DoD leadership and presidential administrations regardless of party must 
consider the ramifications of lack of procurement programs for nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems, and underfunding nuclear critical infrastructure, NC3, and human capital. 
As NPRs progressed in the three decades since the end of the Cold War the United States 
fell behind the rest of the world in terms of weapon and system technology and capability, 
creating a serious vulnerability. Furthermore, the effect of underfunding critical 
infrastructure and NC3 as a result of the 1994 NPR was evident in all the subsequent NPRs. 
Accordingly, nuclear personnel, both civilian and military, must be given opportunities to 
exercise their skills to prevent the United States from further falling behind the rest of the 
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world. Lastly, recognition and praise must be given to these personnel to combat declining 
morale and prevent future crises that require response such as the costly FIP. 
Most importantly, consideration should be given to the effect of the U.S. nuclear 
posture on the rest of the world. As characterized by the 1994 NPR, the United States must 
be conscious of the fact that the way it conducts itself influences Russia.460 Some scholars 
argue that the U.S. and NATO would defeat Russia in a conventional conflict, and that 
Russian military strategy and nuclear policy is simply a realistic response to threats. 
Debating this theory is outside the scope of this thesis; however, there is strong evidence 
in Russia’s military strategy that it is reactionary. According to a RAND Corporation 
report,  
The new [military doctrine of Russia] is more specific about the Western 
weapons systems that endanger or threaten Russia. Global strike, long a 
concern, is for the first time specifically called out in doctrine. Russia 
promises to oppose the efforts of others to “attain military superiority” by 
deploying missile defenses, space weapons, or strategic conventional 
precision weapons. It calls for an agreement, under UN auspices, to regulate 
the use of space.461 
The report continues to state that, “Russia maintains, as it has in the past, that it will use 
military force only defensively, when other options have failed,” and admits that Russia is 
a state that, “sees a lot to defend against.”462 The Kremlin is becoming increasingly 
skittish, and the Pentagon must be mindful of this when crafting nuclear posture policy or 
missile defense. China should also be monitored closely despite its economic ties with the 
United States. Although the bilateral trade between the United States and China could 
prevent war, it could also allow China’s nuclear program to grow unchecked and 
uncontrollably.463 The situations in Europe and Asia are distinctly different from each 
other, and must be treated as such. 
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C. TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Each post-Cold War NPR generally acknowledged an ultimate goal of “nuke-zero” 
or a world free of nuclear weapons. To realists, the concept is a fairy tale, a Utopia that 
would never exist. President Obama acknowledged that this goal was ambitious and would 
not be reached quickly in both his speech in Prague and in the 2010 NPR.464 However, 
this is not a reason to give up on it. In the meantime, nuclear weapons have made the world 
a safer place, and despite alarmist reactions to regional crises they will continue to do so. 
As technology advances and the world evolves, nuclear weapons, their associated systems, 
and the men and women who build, maintain, operate, and guard them must be funded, 
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APPENDIX A.  NPR TRENDS MATRIX 
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return to GPC. 
Claims China 
seeks to counter 
the US. States 
U.S. does not 




“Time to change the 
way we think about 
nuclear weapons.” 
But maintains 
support of triad. 
Establishes a 











U.S. maintains more 
nuclear weapons than 
is needed for 
deterrence. Returns 
to traditional triad. 
Considered 
eliminating one leg, 
but decided against it. 
Must minimalize and 
make more efficient. 
Concurs with 
previous NPRs 
that triad (with 
NATO dual 
capable aircraft 
and NC3) is most 
cost effective 
and strategically 










system. Binds C3 in 
with Intelligence. 





and Control) is 
critical to ensure 
effectiveness of 
force structure. It 
will become 
more complex 






targeting as a 
means of 
ensuring first 
strike and missile 
defense 
capability. 





Must be flexible 
and capable: 






























portions of defense 
industrial base that 
are unique to 






















authorities in order to 








Decades of age 
and 
underfunding. 





























WMDs, but says 




forensics to counter 
use by non-state 
actors or terrorists. 
Renews commitment 





work on non-state 
actors as well. 
Preventing nuclear 
terrorism is the #1 
priority. Claims threat 
is growing. Cold War 
era arsenal is not 
suited to counter 
terrorism and 
proliferation of states 
and non-state actors. 
Three element 
approach. 










the Kim regime. 
Strategy is 
“defense in 
depth.” Has its 
own section and 








following Cold War, 
in particular START. 
Will continue to 
conform to current 
treaties. Creating 
force plans based on 
assumed 
implementation of 
START I and II. Fully 
implement NPT, 
BWC, and CWC. 
US was 
complying with 
START I and 
transparency is a 
good baseline. 
START II provision 
is unacceptable 
(incompatible?) 




to retain ability 
to test in the 
future. 
Will seek ratification 
of CTBT. Accuses 
other countries of 
violating NPT (N 
Korea and Iran). Must 
renew and strengthen 
NPT. Development of 
New START, which 
will drastically reduce 
Moscow Treaty 
numbers. Proposal of 
a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty.  
Plans to comply 
with all treaties 
and agreements. 











only if verifiable 
and enforceable. 







nuclear scientists to 













Morale is slipping due 
to aging facilities and 
lack of national 
consensus on the role 
of nuclear weapons. 
Personnel must be 
focused on. Discusses 
surveillance of 
nuclear personnel. 
Difficult to recruit and 
maintain scientists 
and engineers from 
the next generation. 
Investment must be 
made. First 








are held to 
rigorous 
standards and 
are highly vital. 
Hails nuclear 
personnel for 


















civilians as part 
of the nuclear 
force. Shows 
decline in civilian 
and military 
wartime deaths 









is lagging on drawing 
down. U.S. must 
remain conscious 
that the way they 
conduct themselves 
will influence Russia. 
Concern about 














Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
and Iran. 
Russia and China are 
primary nuclear 
power threats, yet 
China and U.S. are 
increasingly 
interdependent. 
Russian relations are 
good, but there is 
concern over the rate 
at which China is 
expanding. Must 
reduce nuclear 
ambitions of N Korea 
and Iran. Strengthen 
IAEA safeguards. 
Impede nuclear trade 
and enforce 
consequences. 
US is reducing 
number and 
salience of nukes 
while others 
such as Russia 
and China are 
doing the 
opposite. Claims 
N Korea is 
violating UN Sec 
Council 
guidance. Iran 
has agreed to 
constraints yet 
still has the 
capacity to 
develop in less 










is centered on 
foreign threats. 
Specific sections 
on Russia, China, 
Iran, and N 













review in FY 
2002. 
Nuclear threat to 
NATO is historically 
low, yet U.S. presence 
is vital to 
cohesiveness and 
comfort. Any change 
will be reviewed and 
approved by the 
alliance. Mentions 
that there is no 
alliance in Asia, but 
the U.S. will maintain 
its commitments. 
Strong language 
in support of 
allies and 
partners. U.S. 
needs to be 
credible and 
reliable- which 







support. Priority is 
to stem 
proliferation. 




Hasten START I, II, 
and future reduction 
negotiations. 






First NPR to set 
framework for future 
policy to work toward 
“nuke-zero.” U.S. will 
not develop new or 
test warheads. 
Increase NNSA 
funding by 25%. 
Focus strongly on 
enforcing 
consequences of NPT 
non-compliance. 
Supports NPT. 




























and security. Key 
missions must be 












Shift away from 
relying on 




flexibility of forces 
for modern 
deterrence. 
Defines the word 
“Deter.” P4 also 
has good quote. 
Must be 
“credible.” Force 
will get scaled back 
to move away 
from Cold-War era 
posture into a 
more appropriate 







nuke use. There 
are no benefits to 
use. Identifies 3 
things enemies 
must realize. No 
“one size fits all” of 
deterrence. 
Capabilities must 
be flexible to tailor 
deterrence. This 




Sections on what 
to do if deterrence 
fails. Strengthens 









of U.S. ground 
forces. Strategic 
bombers taken off 
alert along with 
Naval NSNF. 





















options are best 
action if 
deterrence fails. 












2nd leg of “New 









defenses- they are 
a cause for 













Weapons (ADW) to 
assure allies. 
Nuclear weapon 
role in deterring 
CBW attacks is 




role in deterring 
CBW attacks is 















ICBMs will be de-
MIRV’ed (Multiple 
Re-entry Vehicle). 
450 missiles on 
alert at time of 
publication. 
400 single warhead 
Minuteman III 
missiles spread 





scale of attack 









carrying Trident II 












number to 12. 
No specific number: 
Ohio-Class subs 
with D-5 Trident II 









66 B-52 bombers, 
reduced from 94 
planned. 
Reorientation of B-
1 to conventional 
role. 
Keep B-2 and B-52 
fleet operational 
for 35–40 years. 
Bomber fleet of 76 




of some B-52s to 
conventional role 
will be considered. 
Most flexible and 
visible. 46 B-52H 
and 20 B-2A 
supported by 
refueling aircraft. 
Not maintained day 
to day alert. To be 











nuclear weapons in 
Europe at 10% of 




claims “no change” 










B61 gravity bombs 
on F-16 DCA. 
Forward presence is 
a requirement. 
Other 
Eliminate role of 
carrier based dual 
capable aircraft, 
retain continental 
based dual capable 
aircraft. Eliminate 
option to carry 




Fleet of operational 
tankers for 35–40 
years. 
Development and 






based), in support 
















deterrence fail, and 










No more than 20 
















replace SLBM in 
2029. No plan for 
common missile. 




plan for bombers. 

















studies are in 
works for missile 
and submarine 
replacement. 













SSBNs to replace 
Ohio Class. Begin 












21 Raider to 
counter enemy 
advances in air 
defense. Will 
supplement then 
replace starting in 
2020s. LRSO to 
replace ALCM. 
Outfit F-35 for 
nuclear capability. 
























Develop an earth 
penetrator to 




an ADW.  
Focused on 
extending life of 
current warheads 
vs. building new. 
Will not test or 
develop. LEP 






Gravity Bomb LEP 
and modifications 
to fit on F-35. 




Replace W78 to 
field on GBSD. 
Sustain B-83-1 













































































































Produce at least 
80 Plutonium pits 






































get a little off 
topic, discussing 
other military 
situations of the 
time such as 
Haiti. 
Somewhat hard 
to read and 





Lots of talk but 
lacks specific 
plans. 
Much more up 
front than other 
NPRs and not 
afraid to call a 










APPENDIX B.  1994 NPR 
The 1994 NPR information cited in this research is from an unofficial compilation 
of unattributed contemporaneous press releases, speeches, and PowerPoint slides that 
have become widely accepted as representative of the first post-Cold War United States 
Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs) initiated in 1994 by President William J. Clinton. 
Readers interested in reviewing the collected documents pertaining to this 1994 NPR 
should contact the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library.
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